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Abstract

This thesis examines the Jamaican financial crisis which began in the mid-1990s and lasted until
approximately the turn of the 21st century. It explores the role of Jamaica’s longer-term
economic trajectory in causing the crisis – specifically, its relationship with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. After experiencing a balance of payments crisis in 1977,
Jamaica sought financial assistance from the IMF. The policies implemented as part of this
assistance program wreaked economic havoc in Jamaica and led the government to implement
policies that ultimately resulted in the collapse of Jamaica’s financial sector. Scholars over time
have focused on shorter-term causes of the crisis such as insufficient financial regulation, poor
macroeconomic policymaking by politicians, and mismanagement of financial institutions. From
the examination of newspaper archives, government documents, IMF publications, and
secondary sources, it is evident that the financial crisis of the 1990s was driven in large part by
the longer-term trajectory of the Jamaican economy. This longer-term period was characterized
primarily by the policies implemented by the IMF throughout the late 1970s, the 1980s, and the
early 1990s. This thesis finds that the IMF’s policies led to a shift in the focus of the
government’s economic policies from earning foreign exchange to accessing foreign exchange.
This inappropriate focus ultimately resulted in the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime
in 1991, which caused the crisis of the mid-1990s.
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Introduction
Jamaica gained independence from Britain in 1962, more than 400 years after colonists from
Europe set foot on this beautiful island in the Caribbean Sea. After independence, the
government set out to industrialize the Jamaican economy by luring cash-rich and experienced
multi-national corporations to invest in the island. Throughout the remainder of the 1960s and
even in 1970, the country enjoyed strong economic growth, with the lowest GDP growth rate
during this period hovering around 2% while the strongest exceeded 10%. However, few enjoyed
the social and economic benefits of this growth, and the island was consequently rife with sociopolitical conflict. The Jamaican populace was frustrated at the limited opportunities for socioeconomic advancement and poor standard of living possessed by most of the population.
Amid this chaos, a charismatic editor of a local newspaper, son of a political party leader, and
London School of Economics-educated trade unionist, emerged. His name was Michael Manley.1
He would go on to lead one of the greatest social revolutions in Jamaica’s history,
revolutionizing the opportunities granted to the less fortunate and angering the capitalists who,
he argued, stifled socio-economic progress of the Jamaican populace for so long.
Nonetheless, Manley’s social revolution did not come without cost. The social programs which
he instituted placed an enormous economic burden on the government’s budget, forcing it to
borrow far in excess of what it earned in order to fund this spending. The alienated middle and
upper classes, frustrated with the changing social scene and terrified of the threat of communism
fled with their skills, businesses, and capital, further jolting the economy into a downward spiral.

1

“The Most Honorable Michael Manley (1924 -1997),” National Library of Jamaica, accessed December 16, 2021,
https://nlj.gov.jm/project/rt-hon-michael-manley-1924-1997/.
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Further, as the United States of America became wary of the relationship between Jamaica and
several other communist and socialist nations, they mobilized the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to wreak social, political, and economic havoc in Jamaica. It utilized media campaigns
overseas to stifle the tourist industry and is even rumored to have been the mastermind behind
the “Eventide Home fire” in which more than 100 old, disabled individuals burnt to death in a
nursing home in May 1980.2 With the country socially and politically destabilized, and the
economy being ravaged, the country’s holdings of foreign exchange were continuously drained
until in 1977, unable to pay for necessary imports, Jamaica faced a balance of payments crisis.3
During this moment of crisis was when Jamaica’s relationship with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) truly developed. Jamaica had engaged on a minimal basis with the institution before
but never while in the face of an economic disaster. However, with nowhere else to turn to obtain
necessary financing amidst the crisis, Jamaica’s government sought assistance from the IMF.
The IMF is an institution that was formed near to the end of World War II. Its purpose was to
develop an international fund with member countries which would all contribute to the fund.
When any of these countries required economic assistance, they would then be able to borrow
from the fund. Jamaica became a member in 1963.4
Notwithstanding the convenience and utility of this economic assistance, it came with
conditions.5 These were largely centered around devaluing Jamaica’s currency to make its

“Remembering the Eventide Home fire victims,” Jamaica Observer, accessed December 16, 2021,
https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/remembering-the-eventide-home-fire-victims_133743.
3
A nation’s balance of payments refers to the difference between its exports and its imports. In simple terms, a
nation faces a balance of payments crisis when its imports exceed its imports and it does not have sufficient foreign
exchange to pay for the difference.
4
“Jamaica: Financial Position in the Fund as of November 30, 2021,” International Monetary Fund, accessed
December 14, 2021, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberKey1=510&date1key=2099-1231.
5
“About the IMF,” IMF, accessed December 16, 2021, https://www.imf.org/ebout.
2
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exports cheaper on the international market but imports more expensive to Jamaicans. The IMF
reasoned that this would aid Jamaica in saving foreign exchange that would be otherwise spent
on imports, and in earning foreign exchange from foreigners that would have been spent on other
countries’ goods. Some of the IMF’s other policies included reducing government spending,
restricting wages, and limiting government borrowing. Despite these changes, Jamaica continued
to suffer from a dearth of foreign exchange. Jamaica’s relationship with the fund continued
throughout the 1980s. However, because the policies implemented by the IMF were ineffective
in improving Jamaica’s ability to earn more foreign exchange, Jamaica’s leaders primarily had to
resort to creative adjustments to regulation surrounding foreign exchange in order to increase the
central bank’s, and the government’s, access to badly need foreign exchange. Eventually, in
1991, this culminated in the liberalization of the Jamaican foreign exchange regime.
This liberalization meant the removal of controls that restricted the ability of Jamaicans to move
foreign exchange into and out of the country, controls that set the price of the Jamaican dollar
relative to other currencies, and others that limited the amount of foreign exchange that each
individual or business could buy or hold. Almost immediately, already slow economic growth
ground to a halt, inflation soared uncontrollably, the value of the Jamaican dollar plummeted and
unemployment climbed. To combat this economic instability, Minister of Finance Omar Davies,
and the Bank of Jamaica, implemented a high interest rate policy aimed at reducing spending in
the economy so as to tame inflation. This policy was also aimed at stabilizing the value of the
Jamaican dollar by luring foreign investors to purchase Jamaican dollars and to make
investments in Jamaican financial securities offering high interest rates.
However, with the lure of high interest rates on government securities banks feared losing their
depositors and as such increased the deposit rates that they offered. Consequently, they also
3

began to lend at high interest rates that their borrowers could not afford. Life insurance
companies were also drawn into the fray as their policyholders preferred to buy high interest rate
government securities rather than life insurance policies. Thus, life insurance companies began to
offer policies to the public that offered high interest rates. Imprudently, they used these funds to
make investments whose returns could not finance the payments of interest on the policies that
they sold or interest payments on debt that they owed to commercial banks.
Among these institutions, the Blaise Trust and Merchant Bank was the first financial institution
to become implicated in the financial crisis. Blaise was a diversified financial institution
operating in Jamaica’s financial sector. In 1994, a new majority shareholder began to direct its
operations. In the same year, a representative of this new shareholder began to headhunt Patrick
Hylton, a rising star in the Jamaican financial sector who was working as a manager at Citizens
Bank. Blaise sought Hylton to be the institution’s new managing director. However, only days
after beginning his brief stint at Blaise, Hylton realized that it was insolvent. He immediately
relayed that fact to the Bank of Jamaica as well as to the Minister of Finance. 6 After conducting
its investigations, the Ministry of Finance took over Blaise’s operations in mid-1994 citing its
poor and unethical operational practices and insolvency as the main reasons. 7
Only a year, later talks of trouble at another of the island’s large banks surfaced. This was
Century National Bank. After several failed attempts to provide it with the liquidity that it

Bank of Jamaica is Jamaica’s central bank. A central bank is an independent financial institution that prints and
manages the supply of a nation’s currency and sets monetary policy for the nation. It also has economic mandates
such as to limit inflation and minimize unemployment. It is most countries, it is a politically independent institution
meaning that its policies are determined by its own judgement, not by the instructions of the government.
7
“Hylton offers inside view of how financial sector was saved,” The Daily Gleaner, May 13, 2011
6
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needed, the Ministry of Finance stepped in and took control of Century’s operations – in similar
fashion to Blaise.
In 1996, as more banks continued to fail following the Blaise and Century failures, executives in
the life insurance industry began to plead to the Jamaican government for financial help.
Subsequent analysis of the financial condition of most of these institutions revealed that they
were hopelessly insolvent. As in the case of Blaise and Century, the Ministry of Finance also
stepped in and took control of the operations of these insolvent life insurance companies.
The failure of financial institutions proliferated throughout the financial sector in 1996.
Subsequently, the Jamaican government formed a government-owned investment vehicle called
the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) in January of 1997. Its purpose was to
ensure that the funds of depositors in failed banks and policyholders in failed insurance
institutions would not lose their money. In short, it did so by injecting cash into these
institutions, and purchasing their ‘bad’ assets such as non-performing loans and underperforming
real estate. It then sought to liquidate these assets to recover its investments in these institutions.8
Though beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to note that FINSAC would go on to
exact tremendous social and economic costs on the lives of the Jamaican people.
Thesis
This thesis argues that the policies implemented by the IMF in Jamaica between the late 1970s
and the early 1990s were responsible for the crisis because they forced the government to
employ varying strategies to increase its access to foreign exchange. This was because the IMF’s

“The Finsac’d want to know, Minister,” Jamaica Observer, accessed December 16, 2021,
https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/letters/The-Finsac-d-want-to-know--Minister_94243.
8
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policies failed to improve Jamaica’s economic performance, and by extension, its foreign
exchange earnings. However, the country’s foundering economic condition wedded it to the IMF
given its limited foreign exchange earnings, and its lack of creditworthiness that precluded it
from seeking assistance elsewhere. Therefore, given the nation’s sustained need for foreign
exchange, no meaningful source by which to earn more, and no alternative sources of financing,
the government adjusted regulations surrounding the nation’s currency to access badly needed
foreign exchange. Liberalization in 1991 which ultimately led to the financial crisis beginning in
the mid-1990s was one of these adjustments. Finally, the argument also notes that conditionality
of loans provided to Jamaica after liberalization prohibited a reversal in the government’s
commitment to a ‘market-determined’ exchange rate. This meant that the government had to stay
the course with this perilous policy.
Literature Review
Jamaican scholars, primarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s, dedicated substantial effort to
understanding the causes of this crisis. However, these works focus on the short-term causes of
the crisis. They posit causes such as insufficient regulation of the financial sector, poor
macroeconomic policy decisions by the Jamaican government during the pre-crisis period, and
mismanagement of financial institutions by executives in the sector. Despite the indubitable
relevance of these arguments, these pieces fail to recognize the significance of Jamaica’s longerterm economic trajectory, and in particular, its relationship with the IMF.
In terms of commercial bank and life insurance company mismanagement, two works stand out.
The first of these is “Stabilization and the Jamaican Commercial Banking Sector (1991-1997)”.
This piece was authored by Robert Stennett, Pauline Batchelor, and Camille Foga. In this paper,
the authors examine the crisis from a microeconomic and macroeconomic standpoint. In terms of
6

macroeconomics, they consider the contractionary monetary policies which were enacted during
the early 1990s to combat the inflationary pressures which arose on account of the “liberalization
of the foreign exchange regime.” This liberalization was essentially removing exchange rate
controls that previously existed to safeguard the value of the Jamaican dollar on the international
foreign currency markets. From a microeconomic perspective, they consider the management
decisions made by commercial bank executives. Based on their analysis, Stennett et al. argue that
both the contractionary monetary policies which were enacted, as well as poor managerial
decisions by commercial bank executives were practically equally responsible for the crisis.9
The second important piece related to this subject was produced by one of the authors of the
aforementioned paper, Camille Foga. In “Developments in the Life Insurance Industry in
Jamaica (1990 – 1998): Consequences for Monetary Policy,” Foga analyses the characteristics of
different life insurance companies in Jamaica between 1990 and 1998. She focuses particularly
on the degree of conservatism which the companies’ managements employed in their finances
based on whether the government had to take over or assist in the financial stabilization of the
company or not. Her analysis reveals that those life insurance companies in which the
government did not have to intervene tended to be more conservatively managed than those
which required intervention.10
Another commonly cited cause of the crisis which is largely addressed by the literature is the
influence of insufficient regulation. The argument posited by scholars with regards to this is that
lack of regulatory or supervisory oversight allowed the managers of financial institutions to

Robert R. Stennett, Pauline M. Batchelor, and Camille S. Foga, “Stabilisation and The Jamaican Commercial
Banking Sector (1991-1997),” Social and Economic Studies 48, no. 1/2 (1999): 345–377.
10
Camille Foga, “Developments In The Life Insurance Industry In Jamaica 1990 - 1998: Consequences For
Monetary Policy,” Social and Economic Studies 50, no. 3/4 (2001): 209–232.
9
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undertake reckless policies which eventually led to the insolvency of these institutions. There are
several papers which address this issue. Foga’s work on life insurance companies is one
example. Aside from considering the degree of managerial conservatism concerning institutions
in which the government intervened and institutions in which the government did not intervene,
she also considers the impact of insufficient regulatory oversight on the life insurance industry.
This portion of Foga’s work focuses on four main issues. These are minimum initial capital
requirements, minimum capital adequacy requirements, investments, regulations, as well as
power of the Superintendent of Life Insurance in Jamaica. Foga details the aspects of each of
these subjects which are representative of the lack of sufficient regulatory oversight of financial
institutions. For instance, when considering the Superintendent of Life Insurance in Jamaica, she
references the existence of certain operational requirements imposed on life insurance
companies. However, she also references the fact that despite these requirements, the companies
were not required by law to provide proof of meeting these requirements to the Superintendent of
Insurance when such proof was requested. Therefore, although the law provided for certain
requirements, supervision of adherence to these requirements was not as strongly facilitated.11
Another scholar who authored work concerning the influence of regulatory oversight on the
crisis is David Tennant. The first of them is his paper co-authored with Colin Kirkpatrick of the
University of Manchester. The paper, published in October 2011, is titled “Responding to
Financial Crisis: Better off without the IMF? The Case of Jamaica.” In the article, the authors
reference the issue of loan loss provisions. The loose regulatory standards at the time provided
bank managers with the ability to refrain from recording overdue loans as a part of loan losses
for up to 6 months after they became delinquent. After 6 months of delinquency loans could be

11
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counted as non-performing. This, according to the authors, allowed banks to inflate earnings and
to display a false image of financial fortitude.12 Tennant’s “Lessons Learnt by the Survivors of
Jamaica’s Financial Sector Crisis” also speaks to the role of the lack of regulatory oversight in
causing the crisis. However, whereas his work with Kirkpatrick concerned regulatory
inadequacies which caused the crisis, this paper is slightly different. Tennant’s methodology in
this paper is to solicit the opinions of managers of banks which survived the crisis as well as of
regulators. Thus, it refers to changes suggested rather than directly to ‘causes’ of the crisis.
Despite the focus on changes which were suggested, one can infer that suggesting these changes
implies that they were in some way causes of the crisis. Some of these changes include more
stringent reporting, harsher fines for wrongdoing, and the closure of fund management firms or
other financial institutions, the activities of which, were not legally bound by meaningful
regulatory oversight.13 Finally, James Dean, an economist and professor at the University of the
West Indies has also published work on the lack of sufficient regulation in Jamaica’s financial
sector before the crisis. His work, “Can Financial Liberalization Come Too Soon?” states that
“Jamaica’s banks, credit unions, and insurance companies were under-capitalized, undersupervised, and under-regulated. In fact, the oversights were legion, far too extensive to be
documented here.”14
Thus, it is evident that scholarship on the crisis does not focus on the role of Jamaica’s long-term
economic trajectory in causing the crisis, much less on the IMF’s policies and actions throughout

Colin Kirkpatrick and Tennant, David, “RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISIS: BETTER OFF WITHOUT
THE IMF? THE CASE OF JAMAICA,” n.d., 28.
13
David Tennant, “LESSONS LEARNT BY THE SURVIVORS OF JAMAICA’s FINANCIAL SECTOR
CRISIS,” Savings and Development 30, no. 1 (2006): 5–22.
14
James Dean, “Can Financial Liberalization come too soon?,” Social and Economic Studies, no. 4 (December
1998): 53.
12
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that longer period. Accordingly, this thesis adds to the existing scholarship by providing a
longer-term perspective and examining the role of the IMF’s policies in causing the crisis.
Presentation of the Argument
This thesis’ chapters are organized based on its argument that Jamaica’s longer-term economic
trajectory, and specifically, its relationship with the IMF was one of the fundamental causes of
the crisis. In accordance with the goal of analyzing this relationship and illustrating its
importance, Chapter 1 provides a pre-IMF background in Jamaica. This chapter serves to show
the reader how Jamaica’s economy developed after independence and ultimately how the island
came to require the assistance of the IMF. It details the government's post-independence
economic plan, the industries of primary importance to the economy, the social circumstances
that led to Michael Manley’s rise to power, the policies he implemented while in power, and the
forces that drove the decline in Jamaica’s economic progress throughout the 1970s. Chapter two
then delves into Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF. It details how the relationship between the
two entities was formed, the policies that were implemented in Jamaica by the IMF, and the
attitudes of different important actors towards these policies. More importantly, it posits four
specific reasons for which the IMF’s policies led the Jamaican government to institute
liberalization of the foreign exchange regime. It shows that the IMF’s mandated devaluation of
the Jamaican dollar was inappropriate within the context of the Jamaican economy, that its
policies destabilized the Jamaican economy, that its policies fostered economic stagnation in
Jamaica, and finally that the IMF championed an ideology of economic liberalization which was
ultimately damaging to Jamaica. The third and final chapter explains and illustrates the tightdemand monetary policy implemented by the Jamaican government after liberalization of the
foreign exchange regime – particularly the high interest rate policy, and it explains how this
10

high-interest rate policy led to the demise of dozens of banks and insurance companies across
Jamaica. It shows how the high interest rate policy led banks into offering prohibitively high
interest rates that its borrowers could not afford to service. It also shows how life insurance
companies took funds from the public under policies which promised to pay exceedingly high
interest rates that the investments made with these funds ultimately could not finance.
In summary, this work illustrates the link between Jamaica’s longer-term economic trajectory
and its relationship with the IMF, the link between the IMF’s policies in Jamaica and the
liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, the link between the liberalization of the foreign
exchange regime and the high interest rate policy, and finally, the link between the high interest
rate policy and the financial crisis of the 1990s. By this it aims to show the importance of
Jamaica’s long-term economic trajectory, specifically its relationship with the IMF in causing the
Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s.

11

Chapter 1: Path to Peril
The Jamaican Financial Crisis of the 1990s was an approximately half-decade long meltdown of
the Jamaican financial system, characterized by numerous national bank failures, nationalization
of financial institutions, countless defaults of creditors, mounting national debt, among numerous
other occurrences. As noted in the introduction to this piece, the scholarly discourse surrounding
this crisis is both largely outdated and also focuses excessively on the short-term causes of the
crisis. For example, scholars such as James Dean discusses insufficient regulation of Jamaica’s
financial sector, at length. Other scholars such as Stennett, Batchelor, and Foga, in their work
discussing the relative impact of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors in causing the
financial crisis, speak to the importance of mismanagement of financial institutions, and to
misguided macroeconomic decisions made by politicians during the immediate pre-crisis phase.
However, despite the correctness of these observations, the longer-term trajectory of the
Jamaican economy played a fundamental role in causing the crisis, specifically, its relationship
with the IMF during this period.
As such, this chapter, begins to aid in filling these gaps in the literature by presenting the
trajectory of Jamaica’s macroeconomic development leading up to the beginning of its
relationship with the IMF in 1977. This serves to lengthen the period of consideration
surrounding the crisis back to the island’s immediate pre- and post-independence beginnings in
the early 1960s. More specifically, the chapter will detail the relevant social, geopolitical, and
macroeconomic highlights between approximately 1962 and 1977.

12

The Roaring ‘60s
After achieving independence from Britain in 1962, Jamaica’s government embarked on a plan
to foster economic growth and development. Like the governments of many other newly
independent, developing nations in the Americas, the Jamaican government opted to pursue a
model for economic growth based on industrialization. This was largely influenced by a similar
approach in Puerto Rico which was successful.15 Several scholars and policy makers contributed
meaningfully to determining the correct manner in which to pursue this aim. However, the most
recognized is Sir Arthur Lewis, who is known for playing a primary role in the development of
the theory of industrialization by invitation.
The beginnings of Lewis’ provision of economic recommendations to Jamaica began in the mid20th century during his critique of what was known as the Benham proposals. In 1944, the
Jamaican government appointed the Jamaica Economic Policy Committee to examine the
question of industrializing Jamaica. British economist F.C. Benham chaired this committee and
gave recommendations regarding industrialization and general economic growth to the Jamaican
government. These suggestions are known as the Benham proposals. Benham posited that the
creation and protection of new industries in Jamaica would inflate the prices of local goods to
prices higher than those of imported goods, rendering them unable to compete effectively. He
also posited that industrialization would not solve Jamaica’s unemployment “problem”, thus
leading to his third and final conclusion that “the government should not invest in new
enterprises or lend money for that purpose.”16

Déborah Berman Santana, “Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap: Colonial Roots of a Persistent Model for "Third
World" Development,” Revista Géografica, no. 124 (January – December 1998): 89.
16
Terrence Farrell. “Arthur Lewis and the Case for Caribbean Industrialisation,” Social and Economic Studies 29,
no. 4 (December 1980): 56.
15
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Lewis’ disagreed with Benham’s proposals and made several alternate proposals of his own.
Contrary to Benham, he argued that Jamaica was overpopulated for an island of its size and as
such would need additional non-agricultural economic activities to support growth in the nation’s
labor force and a decrease in unemployment. He thus saw a need for industrial development in
Jamaica which would complement agricultural production. Lewis also argued that the small size
of Jamaica’s domestic market would be insufficient to support meaningful industrial
development and so it needed to “target manufactured products for extra-regional markets”.
However, most importantly, Lewis noted that “the establishment of an industrial complex is an
expensive undertaking requiring marketing skills, capital, and technical expertise.” Given the
low per capita income of Jamaica and other Caribbean islands at the time, he therefore posited
foreign investment would be required to produce the quantity of goods and services necessary to
serve the domestic and foreign markets. This is the foundation of one of the concepts for which
Lewis is perhaps most well-known – industrialization by invitation.17
Industrialization by invitation is a model of economic growth based on fostering industrial
growth, primarily within developing economies, by creating incentives to encourage foreign
investment in the economy. These incentives are generally tax breaks, protectionism policies
such as import quotas and tariffs, ready-built infrastructure such as factories, and the prohibition
of employee unionism. Based on these incentives, a significant number of foreign companies
invested in the Jamaican economy throughout the 1960s, leading to strong economic growth
within that period. This is evident in the bauxite industry throughout the decade and before.
During the 1950s, several companies entered the country in order to earn their ‘share’ of the
profits from mining bauxite. Simply defined, bauxite is a “clayey rock” with a high alumina

17

Andrew S Downes, “Arthur Lewis and Industrial Development in the Caribbean: An Assessment,” n.d., 32.
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content. Alumina is a mineral that is converted to aluminium through various scientific industrial
processes. Aluminium is a metal-like material that has many common uses such as in making
soda cans, airplane parts, car parts, and building materials.18 Aside from companies working in
the mining industry, examples of some foreign companies which developed operations in
Jamaica during this period include Kellogg, Goodyear, and Colgate-Palmolive.19
The industries primarily responsible for economic output at the time were the mining and
manufacturing industries. This is because the nation possessed attractive natural resources which
facilitated economic success in these sectors. Foreign companies that invested in Jamaica at the
time accordingly specialized in these areas of production. Mining was primarily focused on
bauxite, of which the country was one of the leading international producers. The significance of
the island’s bauxite production in an international context is evident in an article by one of the
country’s leading newspapers, The Daily Gleaner. The article notes that “During 1966 the output
of bauxite…rose to a new high level of 9.12 million tons, i.e. 480,561 tons more than last year –
an increase of 5.6%. This production enabled Jamaica to produce approximately 23% of the
world’s bauxite production and so retained its position as the leading world producer of this
mineral”. Additionally, plans were made to expand beyond simply production of raw bauxite
into substantial alumina production. In a Daily Gleaner article in June 1967, it was noted that the
planned “establishment of three new alumina plants in Jamaica” would make the island “…the
largest producer of alumina outside of the USA”. The importance of these developments to the

“Bauxite,” Google, accessed December 16, 2021,
https://www.google.com/search?q=bauxite&rlz=1C1RXQR_enUS969US969&oq=bauxite+&aqs=chrome.0.0i67i43
3j0i67l4j0i67i433l2j0i512j0i131i433i512j0i67.1624j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.
19
, “Toothpaste Makers Sees Bright Future,” The Daily Gleaner, December 28, 1963, 19.
18
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economy was noted when the article revealed that “Jamaica derives twice as much revenue when
a ton of bauxite is processed into alumina in Jamaica instead of being shipped abroad.”20
Manufacturing was also important to the Jamaican economy during this post-independence
period. The significant role that it played in driving the growth of the economy was evident from
as early as 1963. In that year, it was revealed in The Daily Gleaner’s Industrial Supplement that
“one of the most significant changes taking place in the Jamaican economy is the growing
volume of manufactured goods bearing the “Made in Jamaica” label that are being exported all
over the world.” Some of these goods included “Textiles…on a large scale to the US, Canada,
Britain, and West Germany,” “toothpaste and baking powder in the West Indies, Bahamas, and
Bermuda” and “clothing (our biggest industrial export) in the US, Canada and Britain.”21
Furthermore, this momentum was not short-lived. Up to the end of the decade in 1970, a Gleaner
column noted the “the steady progress in the development of manufacturing in respect not only
to new ventures but also in the very pleasing area of existing industries” In addition, the number
of manufacturing enterprises owned by Jamaicans was said to have increased from
approximately 10% to 24.45% between 1968 and 1970.22
Mining and manufacturing were followed in importance by tourism and agriculture, the latter of
which saw a consistently declining role of importance to the economy as the government’s goal
to industrialize the nation progressed. As noted in a Gleaner article in 1966, “…as a proportion
of the gross domestic product, agriculture accounted for 11.7% in 1965 as against 12.6 in 1964
and 13.5 in 1963.” However, it is helpful to note that agricultural output was increasing during
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this period but because of “…falling prices for the main agricultural export crops”, the
percentage of total output which these products comprised continued to decrease.23
Tourism was another industry that was growing in significance and that contributed
meaningfully to Jamaica’s GDP. The Jamaica Tourist Board was established in 1954 to promote
tourism in Jamaica. The Board emphasized Jamaica as a destination where tourists could enjoy
the sun, sea, and sand while enjoying the island’s unique culture. As the country moved from
under British rule and into the era of independence, “the industry continued to grow in terms of
the number of visitors, the amount of accommodation available and revenue.”24 For example,
between 1954 and 1968, tourist arrivals in the island doubled, and tourist spending more than
tripled. Notably, in line with the island’s focus on industrialization by invitation, the government
offered loans, land, and tax breaks to individual developers and companies that looked to build
hotels in Jamaica. Also important is the fact that foreign-owned hotels dominated the tourism
industry.25
Finally, although the financial sector was not a source of major growth at this time, it is
important given the focus of the thesis on a financial crisis. After independence, given the lack of
widespread domestic expertise and resources required to create and operate viable financial
institutions, most were foreign institutions. Examples of such institutions included Bank of
America and Chase Bank.26 Because of the relatively recent development of the sector, at the
time, there was not a particularly robust regulatory framework. However, given that these foreign
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banks were governed by the robust regulatory frameworks from their home countries, the lack of
a Jamaican-born framework was not particularly problematic.
Socio-Political Turmoil
Notwithstanding the strong economic growth which the country enjoyed during this period, the
distribution of the benefits of this growth was exceedingly uneven. The top segment of the
income and wealth distributions earned most of the income and the vast majority of the wealth
respectively. Necessarily, the large bottom segment of the income and wealth distributions
earned the least income and owned the least wealth respectively. According to an article
published in June of 1968, a renowned trade unionist referred to a survey revealing that the
bottom 20% of the income distribution earned 2% of the income.27
These stark differences in income and wealth were also manifested in labor, health care, and
educational opportunities. For example, regarding labor, one issue faced by Jamaica’s people
was the refusal of some employers to recognize trade unions – the primary form of labor
organization during the pre- and immediate post-independence eras. Of course, employees
thought that these unions were important for the protection of their interests. This refusal on the
part of employers led to confrontations and maintained tension between employers and
employees. For instance, one Gleaner article published in April of 1970 described tension
between workers and employers in the hotel industry. Michael Manley, a renowned trade
unionist and leader of the National Workers Union (NWU) at the time noted that there would be
a “major showdown” between members of the union and employers in the hotel industry unless
the “growing tendency among certain hoteliers to refuse recognition of unions was stopped
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immediately”. Manley also noted the “…miserable housing conditions…” and “…lack of decent
home life…” facing workers all across the island. This he said was as a result of the “maldistribution of income”.28
These circumstances fostered populism and fueled Manley’s emergence as a meaningful
contender for political leadership in Jamaica. Manley, a charismatic trade unionist educated at
the London School of Economics, was the son of Norman Manley – Jamaica’s first premier as
well as founder and leader of the People’s National Party (PNP). The younger Manley left
Jamaica in 1943 to study at McGill University in Canada but volunteered to join the Royal
Canadian Air Force only two weeks later. After his service, he returned home where he worked
as an editor with the Public Opinion, a small Jamaican newspaper that covered a wide range of
subjects from sports and business to politics and lifestyle. Shortly after, he left Jamaica to study
at the London School of Economics where he became heavily involved in campus politics,
aiding in forming the West Indies Students’ Union. After completing his studies, he returned
home where he continued to work with the Public Opinion newspaper. On the political front, he
became involved with the PNP and was soon elected to be on the National Executive Council of
the party. He is also noted for having worked extensively with the National Workers’ Union
(NWU) in negotiating workers’ contracts with employers. After his father’s resignation from the
PNP in 1970, Michael was elected to be its new leader.29
Notably, his father Norman was famously quoted as saying “I say that the mission of my
generation was to win self-government for Jamaica. To win political power which is the final
power for the black masses of my country from which I spring. I am proud to stand here today

“ Says union, employers heading for showdown,” The Daily Gleaner, April 29, 1970, 12.
“The Most Honorable Michael Manley (1924 – 1997),” National Library of Jamaica, accessed December 16,
2021, https://nlj.gov.jm/project/rt-hon-michael-manley-1924-1997/.
28
29

19

and say to you who fought that fight with me, say it with gladness and pride: Mission
accomplished for my generation…And what is the mission of this generation? It
is…reconstructing the social and economic society and life of Jamaica.”30 His son, Michael,
would dedicate his political life to this reconstruction.
Social Revolution and Economic Reform
The unfavorable socio-economic conditions under which most of the Jamaican populace lived,
resulted in the PNP, led by Michael Manley, defeating the Jamaica Labor Party’s (JLP) Hugh
Shearer to win the 1972 elections. Shortly after the party’s victory, it assumed the philosophy of
democratic socialism – a system of political and economic organization that emphasizes
inhibiting the ability of the capitalist class to exploit the populace, and which seeks for public
ownership of the nation’s key natural resources and productive infrastructure. Within the context
of the Jamaican economy, a key natural resource was bauxite, and key element of the productive
infrastructure was hotels. Democratic socialism also emphasizes policies such as free healthcare
and free education with the aim of increasing social equity. Thus, unsurprisingly, Manley began
the implementation of policies aimed at social and economic reform that were in line with his
ideology of democratic socialism, shortly after his victory.
For example, one of his first reforms concerned agriculture. As previously described, despite its
steady decline, agriculture was one of the nation’s foremost productive sectors. It thus
understandably employed a large portion of the nation’s population, especially in rural areas.
Notwithstanding the prominence of agriculture as a source of income for many rural small
farmers, many did not have access to suitable or sufficient land “to make their operations
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viable”.31 Additionally, the island produced little food relative to demand and as such Jamaica
had to import a lot. However, the difficulty regarding this problem was not that adequate land did
not exist to foster greater food production but that there was limited access to it. Manley’s
solution to this issue was to implement a two-part plan. The first part focused on recruiting
farmers to work on agricultural plots owned by the government. The second saw the government
“allotting parcels of land also in different parts of the island to willing and able small farmers on
the land-lease basis on condition that these farmers utilize their allotments to the fullest in food
production…”32 These pieces of land were voluntarily provided by wealthy landowners who
leased these large plots to the government.
Another area in which Manley implemented new policies was education. His support for
government investment in human capital was based on his philosophy that “people are the key to
progress.”33 This was an urgent need as the country faced an illiteracy rate of nearly 50% among
the adult population at the time of his election.34 There were several initiatives of relevance in
this area. One was an approximately year-long $87 million program during 1973 for the purpose
of funding the “Skill Training Programme and the National Literacy Programme”. Another
initiative was the extension of access to free secondary education. “Whereas in the past only
2,000 children received free education the entire 4,000 places which were available would be
free as from September this year.” He additionally pledged to extend junior high school
education for two years to facilitate vocational training for young students attending these
schools.35 Manley believed that this would remove many of the socio-economic barriers faced by
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the poor, largely black populace in trying to obtain a respectable standard of living. Another
initiative implemented by Manley included a program known as Jamaica Movement for the
Advancement of Literacy (JAMAL). This was an offshoot of the National Literacy Programme
which he implemented shortly after his election in 1972.36 He also implemented several other
education-related policies for school children aimed at providing poor pupils with a greater
opportunity to attain social mobility. Of course, all these programs need not be described.
In addition to educational and agricultural reform, Manley’s policies also targeted the healthcare
system. He introduced policies of free healthcare for all Jamaicans, expanded the number of
clinics across the island as well as increased the availability of medical care and medication to
Jamaicans. He also instituted legislation on mental health, for instance, which provided more
protection for some of the island’s most vulnerable citizens. Additionally, Manley’s government
launched various healthcare campaigns to educate the island’s masses about different elements of
a healthy lifestyle. For instance, under the Nutrition Education Programme led by the Ministry of
Health, a media campaign was designed to teach Jamaicans about family planning. These
programs educated pregnant women on how to maintain a healthy diet, encouraged them to
breastfeed their babies, and encouraged young Jamaicans to employ family planning before
having children.37
Finally, and importantly, Manley also instituted broad based labor reforms. This was in line with
not only his experience as a trade unionist but with the history of Jamaica’s working class which
since the turn of the 20th century fought the oppressive upper classes on account of the
mistreatment faced by the prior in the workplace. For instance, provisions such as maternity
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leave, paid vacation time, severance payments, and worker compensation were not offered to
workers. Manley instituted reforms to rectify this ill.38
Notwithstanding the social benefits of Manley’s policies, they had substantial economic impacts,
particularly through their impact on the fiscal budget which entails the government’s expected
revenues and planned expenditures. It was this relationship between Manley’s policies and the
country’s economic health that sparked the formation of the link between Jamaica’s long-term
economic trajectory and the financial crisis which emerged in the 1990s.
Socio-economic Reform and the Financial Crisis of the 1990s
This link began to form because Manley’s social programs required a lot of money to be
efficiently operated. As such, the myriad socio-economic reform policies that he implemented
resulted in a significant increase in the government’s budget as funding these policies
necessitated increased government spending. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
government spending was approximately “23 percent in 1971…”, “…33 percent in 1975…” and
49 percent by 1980.39 The nation had to fund this increased spending. However, because its tax
revenues were insufficient, the government issued debt, raised levies on certain exported
commodities like bauxite and nationalized various businesses. Especially with regards to
nationalization, Manley also wanted to the country and its citizens to benefit more from its
natural resources. As such, companies in natural resource-related sectors such as bauxite
companies were seen as suitable targets from which to raise foreign exchange through taxes on
their earnings from Jamaica’s natural resources.
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One notable example of a nationalization occurred in February 1977. In this case “Jamaica
acquired majority shares in the local Kaiser Bauxite Company.” The government paid
approximately USD$5.5 million for a controlling stake of 51% in the company. It expected to
earn more than USD$40 in 1977 from the agreement. 40
In addition to Manley’s apparently aggressive stance towards Jamaica’s middle and upper
classes, the expansion of social services, and the nationalization of businesses on the island
alienated many members of these classes. These individuals felt as though Manley was the face
and foundation of an attack on their wealth and relatively privileged position in society. Because
of these fears, many of the island’s wealth sold their homes, closed their businesses and ran away
to the USA to begin a new life. Aside from the evidently negative economic impact resulting
from the drain in skilled human capital and the shuttering of businesses, this mass migration also
resulted in significant capital flight. Not only did this limit investment to drive economic growth
and development but it also resulted in dearth of foreign exchange. Being a nation so dependent
on imports – and even more so with the loss of a meaningful portion of the nation’s businesses,
this had serious negative implications for the Jamaican economy.
Geopolitical and External Shocks
The drastic alteration in the socio-economic and political climate of the 1970s was not only the
result of internal forces but was also heavily influenced by external forces. These external
influences arose in primarily two ways: geopolitical tension with the Western world as well as
unfavorable international economic developments.
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Beginning with tension with the Western world, criticism stemmed mainly from the USA and
dissatisfaction with the Manley government was manifested primarily through reductions in
foreign aid as well as intervention by through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The
underlying cause of this tension primarily concerned the socialist sentiments of the Manley
administration in addition to its close relationship with foreign nations that shared similar
sentiments, especially with Cuba. This tension can be more clearly understood within the
international geopolitical context of the day. This period was a part of the Cold War era - a
period of antagonism between the USA and the Soviet Union which began shortly after the end
of the Second World War and ended in the mid to late 1980s. The basis of this antagonism was
socio-political and economic ideology which saw the USA was in favor of the capitalist
economic organization and democracy while the Soviet Union supported communism and an
authoritarian state.41 However, aside from championing these ideologies solely in their own
lands, these regions sought to win the loyalty of other nations – to convert them into or maintain
them as capitalist and democratic societies in the case of the USA, and communist or socialist
authoritarian regimes in the case of Russia. Given these goals, these nations dedicated significant
resources to military and intelligence efforts to popularize their own ideologies and to sabotage
that of the enemy. The USA’s intelligence agency was the CIA while the Soviet’s intelligence
agency was the KGB (Committee for State Security). English. In the Caribbean, Cuba, a
communist regime established after a communist revolution between 1953 and 1959, was led by
Fidel Castro and several of his fellow revolutionaries.42
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Manley was known to share a close relationship with Castro, and to be an admirer of the nation’s
approach to pursuing good education and equitable healthcare for its population. Both countries
shared a strong relationship during Manley’s rule. One example of this relationship which still
stands today is the Jose Marti Technical High School which was gifted to Jamaica by Cuba.43
However, given the USA’s ideological opposition to Cuba’s economic organization, and the
relative lack of political and social freedoms given to its people, they also opposed Jamaica’s
close relationship with Cuba, and monitored it closely for fear of Jamaica also becoming a
communist nation. This fear was particularly strong given Manley’s charisma, popularity among
the Jamaican people, and his policies which had the stated aim to re-distribute wealth more
equitably among the members of the Jamaican population. One example of this monitoring by
the CIA was evident in the National Intelligence Daily Cable broadcasted internally by the CIA
in October of 1977. It noted Fidel Castro’s visit to Jamaica in the same month of that year. It
speaks disparagingly about the bond between both nations and criticized the appearance that
Jamaica’s government accepted the false Cuban proposition that Cuba’s aid was offered “without
strings”. It is unclear as to what aid it speaks. Nonetheless, the broad takeaway is that the USA
was uncomfortable with the relationship between the islands and monitored it closely.44
As such, the CIA launched an operation of hostility towards Jamaica designed to undermine the
image of Manley among the Jamaican people. This policy focused on covert economic sabotage,
media propaganda campaigns and social destabilization. One well-known statement rumored to
be made during a conversation between the President Carter and the CIA executives during the
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sabotage of the Chilean communist regime in the 1980s is “make the economy scream”.45 This
was the attitude adopted towards the Jamaican economy. One of the first ways in which this was
instituted was by withdrawing foreign aid from Jamaica which at the time was experiencing a
shortage of foreign exchange both due to the spending required by Manley’s proposals as well as
to the mass exodus of members of the business class who were afraid of Jamaica becoming a
communist country and the government taking their assets. That the USA saw foreign aid as a
useful weapon is evident in a declassified 1977 CIA document discussing the implications of
potential further increases in bauxite levies for American companies mining in Jamaica. The
paper notes that “The US government has some leverage to head off a Jamaican move to raise
taxes. It could, for example, threaten to cancel US aid…”.46 Between 1976 and 1980, foreign aid
to Jamaica decreased significantly. In addition, the United States ensured that financial assistance
from the IMF during a period of economic turmoil would be inadequate to rectify the situation
and that the conditions under which the assistance was granted would also be highly unfavorable.
The same document stated that the CIA could also “use its influence to try to deny funds from
the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and IMF which are critical to Jamaica”.47
In addition to limiting foreign aid, the CIA is rumored to have paid merchants to keep goods at
sea and in warehouses to create an image of scarcity and economic distress. This was, of course,
to weaken the loyalty of Manley’s supporters and to facilitate his replacement with the more
manageable Edward Seaga.
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Propaganda campaigns utilizing local and international media also took place. Local propaganda
had the purpose of fragmenting Manley’s strong base by tarnishing his image in the newspapers.
International propaganda was used primarily to disseminate ideas, images, and information
which would dissuade tourists from visiting Jamaica, thus robbing the nation of one of its
primary sources of national income, and more importantly, foreign exchange.48
Aside from these geopolitical tensions, Jamaica was also negatively affected by several external
economic influences. These included the international inflation crisis of the 1970s –especially
the increase in the price of oil, reductions in the prices of key commodities, and a reduction in
tourism-related revenues. Significant increases in the price of oil badly affected the island’s
bauxite industry which depended heavily on the purchase of external sources for energy
especially for the refinement of bauxite into alumina for export. This was compounded by falling
bauxite prices which, of course, decreased the nation’s ability to generate foreign exchange.
Finally, severe social tensions between the lower class, and the middle and upper classes as well
as Manley’s socialist rhetoric exacerbated by CIA-driven media campaigns resulted in
significant capital flight, also ridding the island of large amounts of foreign exchange.
Thus, it is evident that by the end of the 1970s, Jamaica was experiencing substantial socioeconomic and socio-political distress and chaos. This was also evident in various
macroeconomic metrics. Between 1969 and 1980, the unemployment rate rose from 17.2% to
26.8%, and GDP growth slowed from 5.4% in 1969 to -5.7% by 1980. Finally, inflation rose
from about 6.3% in 1969 to more than 27% by 1980. 49 Net international reserves – the central
banks holdings of foreign currency less its liabilities, were “minus J$171 million” by December
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1977.50 Consequently, at the end of the 1970s, the country was in the midst of a balance of
payments crisis driven by a dearth of foreign exchange, facing high unemployment and inflation,
as well as suffering from decreasing economic output.
This severe crisis was to lead Jamaica to seek the urgent assistance of the International Monetary
Fund in that same year. This would be the beginning of a memorable relationship between
Jamaica and the IMF, one which this thesis argues culminated in the financial crisis of the 1990s.
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Chapter 2: The Role of the IMF in the Liberalization of Jamaica’s Foreign Exchange
Regime
The preceding chapter explains why Jamaica was led to seek IMF assistance. This chapter will
begin to examine more closely and establish more firmly the role of the policies that the IMF
implemented in Jamaica in causing the Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s. It seeks to examine
the IMF’s programs in Jamaica throughout the late 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s. It will
then illustrate how these policies influenced the collapse of Jamaica’s financial sector in the mid1990s. It will do this firstly by presenting several examples of the agreements that the IMF had
with Jamaica. In presenting these examples, some short, essential digressions will be made to
highlight important characteristics of these agreements or simply important points represented by
the examples. After presenting these examples, the chapter will employ four main windows of
analysis to illustrate how IMF policies motivated the Jamaican government’s decision to
liberalize Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime in 1991, and by extension, the government’s
implementation of the attendant high interest rate policy.
The first reason for which the IMF’s policies in Jamaica can be said to have driven the
government’s policy decisions in the early 1990s concerns devaluations of the Jamaican dollar.
The currency devaluations that characterized these agreements resulted in substantial increases in
the rate of inflation. Given that Jamaica’s exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar, the
devaluation-fueled inflation led to the overvaluation of the Jamaican dollar. This overvaluation
of the Jamaican dollar, and thus the devaluation that caused it, helped to strengthen, and
maintain, Jamaica’s black market in foreign exchange. The diversion of foreign exchange from
the official financial system to the black market then exacerbated the shortage of foreign
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exchange faced by the government and the island’s businesses. This shortage was an explicit,
central motivating factor in the government’s decision to remove foreign exchange controls.
Given this focus on devaluation and the other elements of the IMF’s policies, the second reason
for which the IMF’s policies in Jamaica can be said to have been responsible for the
liberalization of the exchange rate regime is that these policies did not place sufficient emphasis
on investment and production. As such, they did nothing to increase Jamaica’s insufficient
foreign exchange earnings and can be said to have played a substantial role in inhibiting it.
Therefore, because the government had no feasible alternative means of earning or accessing
badly needed foreign exchange, they employed various manipulations to the exchange rate
regime to attract foreign currency to the official financial system – most importantly, away from
the black market. Finally, the short-termism, which was encouraged by meeting IMF tests, set in
terms of months rather than years, encouraged the government to employ ‘quick-fixes’ to rectify
the island’s insufficient earnings of foreign exchange.
However, not only did the IMF’s policies result in economic stagnation, but they also worsened
the state of the Jamaican economy. Thus, the third reason for which the IMF’s policies in
Jamaica can be said to have been the motivating factor behind the liberalization of the foreign
exchange regime has to do with their destabilization of the Jamaican economy. This
destabilization caused by the IMF’s “stabilization” policies increased the demand for foreign
exchange while doing nothing to balance this increased demand with increased supply through
greater earnings of foreign exchange. Consequently, both businesses and individuals used legal
and illegal methods to avoid holding Jamaican dollars and to hold their cash assets in the form of
US dollars and other foreign currencies. This exacerbated the shortage of foreign exchange in the
island. With no way of generating foreign exchange to meet urgent short-term needs that
31

required foreign exchange, the Jamaican government was forced to gradually loosen exchange
rate controls in order to direct sufficient foreign currency into the official financial system.
Fourthly, and finally, all of these inappropriate and damaging policies were supplemented by the
IMF’s ideology of economic liberalization. This was an ideology based on the minimization of
government intervention and regulation of various markets and mechanisms within the economy.
It influenced the Jamaican government towards the implementation of liberalization programs
that were imprudent within the context of the Jamaican economy. Moreover, after their
implementation, some of these liberalization policies became conditionalities on which funds
were lent by the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, the IMF’s policies in Jamaica not only
indirectly forced the government towards implementing these policies but eventually conditioned
loans to the Jamaican government on liberalization of the foreign exchange regime.
These four points establish a direct link between the IMF’s policies and the liberalization of the
foreign exchange regime in addition to its attendant high interest rate policy. The third chapter
will establish the link between the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime in addition to the
attendant high interest rate policy, and the financial crisis of the 1990s. Consequently, the points
discussed in this chapter aid in establishing the link between the IMF and the Jamaican financial
crisis of the 1990s, thus illustrating the role played by the IMF in causing the crisis.
Jamaica and the IMF: A Blissful Beginning
Jamaica’s first transaction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) occurred in June of 1963.
It took the form of a Standby Arrangement that provided the island with 10 million Special

32

Drawing Rights (SDRs) in financing.51 The IMF defines SDRs as “an international reserve asset,
created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries official reserves.” 52 SDRs are
convertible into the currencies of IMF members. When countries have entered Standby
Arrangements or other agreements that grant them access to a given number of SDRs, they can
then exchange an amount up to their total allocation for the currencies of other IMF member
countries. Though its value has changed over time, one SDR was first equated to US$1.53
According to the IMF’s announcement of the 1963 Standby Arrangement with Jamaica,
economic growth in Jamaica was substantial, and the Jamaican authorities pursued ‘orderly fiscal
and monetary policies intended to maintain a stable currency and a liberal exchange system.’ It
also noted the ‘steady increase’ in foreign exchange reserves. Despite this relative economic
stability, the IMF noted that the Standby Arrangement was to serve as a ‘secondary line of
reserves for Jamaica against unforeseen short-term balance of payments contingencies’ thus
minimizing ‘interruption’ in the case of any balance of payments difficulties.54 This 12-month
arrangement expired in June of the following year, and Jamaica borrowed none of the funds
available under the agreement. David Coore, the Minister of Finance at the time, simultaneously
revealed that to “take care of any seasonal needs for foreign exchange”, the government would
negotiate a Standby Arrangement of 26.5 million SDRs. According to IMF records, the
government entered into another 12-month Standby Arrangement for 26.5 million SDRs in June
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of 1973. It expired at the end of May 1974.55 This was essentially the final agreement signed
between both parties during a period of relative economic prosperity and calm.
Foreign Exchange Liberalization
Not much more than a decade and 10 IMF agreements later, in September of 1990, Acting Prime
Minister, P.J. Patterson presented a new exchange rate regime which was to be implemented
“with effect from Monday, September 17, 1990.” In his speech, Patterson further states that:
The next initiative which will be central to the functioning of the economy… has to do
with the process by which the exchange rate is determined. In recent months, the official
exchange market has been in a state of severe disequilibrium. Foreign exchange flows
which should normally enter the Bank of Jamaica have been diverted to the illegal street
market…Previously we operated a fixed exchange rate which required forming a
judgement as to the equilibrium rate and adjusting it periodically. The Government has
decided to discontinue this and to move instead to an exchange system where the rate
prevailing from time to time will reflect the underlying forces of demand and supply.
Under this system “all foreign exchange transactions” would “take place through the Inter-bank
foreign exchange Trading System operated by the commercial banks and Bank of Jamaica”.
Furthermore, commercial banks would no longer be purchasing currency to sell to Bank of
Jamaica but would “buy and sell for their own account”. 56
After partial liberalization, the government faced pressure to continue to loosen Jamaica’s
foreign currency controls given the island’s continued shortage of foreign exchange.
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Unsurprisingly, a year later in September of 1991, Minister of Finance, Omar Davies, announced
the total liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime. The Ministry Paper described this
event as “full liberalization of the Exchange Control Regime” beginning on “September 25,
1991”.57 It also stated that “The Government has repeatedly stated its intention to remove
exchange controls on a phased basis so as to remove the distortions created in the economy by
the existence of these regulations”.58
Regarding the legal element of the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, The Ministry
Paper notes that “Exchange Control in Jamaica” was “imposed by Exchange Control Act, Law
50 of 1954”. This was an act consisting of “prohibitions”.59 These prohibitions existed only if the
permission of the Minister of Finance was not given for them to be ignored. Under a scheme of
full exchange rate liberalization, the government intended to repeal the Act. However, because
there were certain laws in the Act that needed to be retained, the entire Act could not be
immediately repealed. Thus, to effect full liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, the
government used “section 45 of the Act” which enabled “the Minster, by order, to amend the
Act, and to suspend the operation of all or any part of the Act.” Essentially, the Minister simply
suspended the portions of the Act which were incompatible with a liberalized exchange rate
regime while leaving the essential elements of the act untouched. For example, the Minister
suspended elements of the act to allow “persons who earn or receive foreign currency…to retain
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it, both here and overseas;” all dealings in securities by residents and non-residents” to be
permissible, and “payments of all kinds for imports or other obligations”.
Finally, the document discusses the monetary policy that the central bank, in conjunction with
the government, would employ to tame the economic effects of liberalization. The Ministry
paper states that the Government would “pursue very tight demand-management policies with
the aim of stabilizing the interest rate.” The document also states that The Bank of Jamaica
would “pursue a very aggressive open market policy” which would likely lead to “increases in
interest rates so as to cut domestic credit demand and correct the existing situation where interest
rates are substantially negative.” Just one month prior to the release of this document, interest
rates were in the range of 24%. Earlier in the year they had exceeded 40% earlier and then fell
sharply to around 30%. Therefore, although interest rates had increased somewhat before, there
was no policy implemented that instituted a sustained regimen of high interest rates. It is also
important to note that this high interest rate policy was an initiative of the Bank of Jamaica – not
a policy imposed on the country by the IMF. Its aim was to reduce the amount of cash in the
pockets of consumers and businesspeople, to limit spending and consequently, inflation.60
This total liberalization of Jamaica’s exchange rate and its attendant high interest rate policy was
to wreak economic havoc in Jamaica during the early 1990s, eventually playing a substantial role
in the financial crisis of the mid-1990s that followed. Foreign exchange liberalization resulted in
inflation rates that were as high as 80% in 1992, and which averaged about 40% over the first
half of the ‘90s decade. The interest rate policy employed to fight this inflation and to stabilize
the exchange rate inhibited investment by businesses, diverted assets away from domestic
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financial institutions – impairing their ability to generate profits and consequently their
incentives to do so, and left domestic individuals and businesses that had to borrow money at
these high interest rates unable to repay their debts. These and other factors combined to result in
the most catastrophic collapse of Jamaica’s financial sector since its independence. But how did
this policy of foreign exchange liberalization come to be implemented?
Turn of the Tide: Jamaica and the IMF
As is evident from chapter one’s discussion, much of the economic progress in Jamaica, referred
to by the IMF after the announcement of the 1963 Standby Arrangement, had not only ceased to
increase but had been erased by the end of the 1970s. As Jamaica increasingly faced balance of
payments challenges in the late 1970s, the government began to re-engage with the IMF to
receive balance of payments financing. According to David Coore, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Finance for Jamaica between 1972 and 1978, Jamaica began discussions with the
IMF for balance of payments-related financing in November of 1976. However, they did not
come to a formal and final agreement at the time, “owing to the imminence of the General
Election.” 61 Negotiations re-opened during April 1977, but significant disagreements prevented
any deal from being signed then.
Digressing momentarily, this notion of disagreement is significant because it characterizes the
relationship between the IMF and most of the developing nations to which it offers financial
assistance. As such, understanding that this disagreement generally exists and why it exists offers
greater insight into the policies implemented by the IMF and the reactions of nations’ leaders and
citizens to these policies. This insight is important because it aids the researcher and readers of
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his work in understanding why events occur in the way that they do – not just that they do occur
in the way that they do.
IMF assistance to countries facing balance of payments difficulties is generally accompanied by
conditionality. Colin Bullock, a scholar who explores IMF conditionality in Jamaica during the
1980s, more formally defines conditionality as ‘…the policies the Fund expects a member to
follow in order to be able to use the Fund’s general resources.’62 The disagreements which arise
between the IMF and its potential debtors – usually countries seeking balance of payments or
fiscal deficit-related assistance – are usually due to these conditions which the IMF requires
countries to meet in order to use its resources. This is for several reasons.
Firstly, these policies generally entail steep reductions in fiscal expenditures. During the final
three decades of the 20th century, many of the countries seeking IMF assistance were developing
nations in the Americas under the leadership of political parties whose philosophies were rooted
in some variety of socialist politics. Political regimes based on socialism tend to require
significant amounts of expenditures by the government to create and maintain the social
programmes which were meant to increase the equity with which resources and socio-economic
opportunity were distributed among the nation’s inhabitants. Examples of these policies include
free education, free healthcare, subsidization of agricultural crops, expansion of public sector
employment, and so forth. These were observed in Jamaica as well as in Latin American nations
like Peru. Because these policies served to increase political popularity, maintain relative social
stability, and increase the standard of living for ordinary citizens – at least in the short-term,
governments were often greatly hesitant to reduce the fiscal expenditures which were associated
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with the maintenance of these programs. As such, when the IMF required a reduction of the
nation’s fiscal deficit in exchange for emergency financing, it resulted in disagreement between
the fund and the country.
Secondly, because these policies were often focused on reducing consumer demand to reduce the
country's imports, tight-demand policies were generally implemented.63 These tight-demand
programs often entailed higher interest rates, reduced wages, greater restrictions on wage
increases, higher consumption taxes, and other policies which were inimical to consumer
spending. Additionally, due to the supplementation of these policies with currency devaluation
programs, and the dependence of many of these developing economies on importation of
consumer goods and raw materials for industrial production, inflation generally increased
significantly after the implementation of these policies. This resulted in substantial reductions in
real income for citizens of these nations and a consequent reduction in their standard of living. 64
This is exemplified in the case of Peru in which an IMF program commenced in August of 1990.
According to the New York Times, after the lifting of price controls, and the liberalization of the
Peruvian foreign exchange regime, the price of fuel increased from 13 cents to $4 in a matter of
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days.65 Another scholar, Michel Chossudovsky, notes an increase of more than 1,000% in the
price of bread.66 However, more importantly, Chossudovsky also notes that, in Peru, the real
earnings of ordinary Peruvian workers decreased by more than 60% in the same month and by
more than 85% about a year later.67 His paper also refers to the substantial role that this played in
the proliferation of cholera infections across the nation. Because inflation so severely reduced
workers’ real spending power, they could no longer afford to boil water or to cook food
appropriately. Thus, they became ill. Such consequences in Peru and in other nations subject to
IMF conditionality often resulted in significant social instability. For instance, in January 1985,
widespread national protests ensued in Jamaica, elicited by austerity measures being
implemented by the government at the time. These measures led to consistent, sharp increases in
the cost of living. The protest in question, which paralyzed the public transportation system and
saw schools and offices closed as well as international flights detoured, commenced due to a
21% increase “in the cost of gasoline and other fuels.” 68
Finally, despite the precarity of their economic circumstances and the substantial need for
emergency funding, nations’ leaders and their people often feel a loss of dignity when the IMF
pairs its loans with such harshly restrictive policies. The factor of such overwhelming control
from an ‘outsider’ is somewhat disconcerting. Alan Garcia, Alberto Fujimori’s predecessor in
Peru, decided to cease debt payments to the IMF and the World Bank during his term in office.
This “was hailed in other debtor nations as a reassertion of sovereignty eroded by the
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international lending agencies and the biggest commercial banks.”69 In a speech at the U.N.
General Assembly in 1985 where Garcia and several other Latin American leaders chastised the
IMF for the harsh terms on which they dealt, Garcia declared, “‘We are faced with a dramatic
choice: It is either debt or democracy.’ ”70 This exemplifies in a practical manner, the
disagreements between the IMF and the leaders of nations which detest the severe stranglehold
that the institution and other multilateral lending institutions have over their countries through its
financing arrangements.
From just these three examples, it is evident that there exist many areas for contention between
the IMF and potential debtors. Jamaica’s early ‘post-prosperity' interactions with the IMF were
no different and were characterized by several points of disagreement. These were “in relation to
important aspects of fiscal and monetary policy, and in relation to the timing of the remedial
measures that had to be undertaken”. Because of these disagreements, discussions between both
parties ended in April 1977 without an agreement being made. However, shortly after, a
Jamaican delegation returned for further discussions in June of the same year.71 This delegation
was comprised of David Coore, the minister of finance, Senator Richard Fletcher, and Arthur
Brown, the Governor of the Bank of Jamaica. They negotiated with the IMF’s managing
director, H. Johannes Witteveen, and other members of the “Fund Staff” in Washington. 72 After
these meetings, an agreement was informally reached.73 This arrangement is shown in the IMF
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records as having been formally arranged in August of the same year and expiring in June
1978.74 It gave Jamaica the right to “purchase (i.e. borrow) …approximately US$74.6 million”,
representing “3 1/3 enlarged credit tranches”.75 The existence of conditionalities associated with
this loan is evident in Coore’s language regarding the arrangement. He notes that:
“There are no conditions attached to the drawing of the first tranche but the drawings in
December and subsequently will be subject to the broad condition that the comprehensive
programme of economic stabilization and reconstruction which the Government has
adopted…must be strictly carried out.”76
The conditionalities associated with the 1977 arrangement focused on wages, the balance of
payments, exchange control, and exchange rate policy. The guidelines on wages were referred to
as “The Incomes Policy”. These guidelines served to limit inflation by ensuring that wage
growth did not exceed growth in production. 77 If wages increase more quickly than the output
produced by those to whom the wages are paid, there is more money in the economy than there
are goods to be bought with it. Because of the insufficient supply, in the face of demand driven
by increased purchasing power, the prices of goods in the economy increase. This broad-based
increase in the prices of goods that ensues across the economy is referred to as inflation.
The fiscal policy aimed to “restrict the use of money creation in financing the budget” so as not
to “spark inflation or create further pressures on the balance of payments”. 78 This concerned the
Bank of Jamaica’s practice of printing money to finance the portion of the government’s
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expenditures that exceeded its revenues. This newly printed money was funneled into the
economy via the government paying businesses for goods and services, paying public sector
employees, and so forth. Because this money was not backed by production, it often led to
inflation because of more money in the system ‘chasing’ the same supply of goods and services.
Regarding balance of payments difficulties, printing more money also relates to inflation.
Because each unit of currency loses value as the rate of inflation increases, the currencies of
countries that face inflation often lose significant value not only in real terms but also on the
currency markets because individuals prefer to hold another currency with a more stable value.
In a nation which does not earn enough foreign exchange to pay for its imports, increased
demand for the same or a smaller supply foreign exchange only further decreases the value of the
local currency. This then further destabilizes the economy because of the inflation that results
from having to purchase foreign goods at a higher price in terms of local currency. Finally, the
fiscal policy also restricted the amount of debt that the government could incur in order to
maintain a debt burden that was manageable over the long term.79
The third element of the IMF’s 1977 arrangement concerned monetary policy and the balance of
payments. In effect, this conditionality was focused on increasing the central bank’s net
international reserves by fostering activities that increased the inflow of foreign exchange and
reducing those such as imports that required the expenditure of foreign exchange.80 Minister
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Coore notes that the country’s goals regarding monetary policy and the balance of payments
were expected to work in tandem with “the incomes policy and fiscal programme”.81
The fourth and final element of the agreement concerned foreign exchange policy. This element
of the newly instituted economic guidelines was the least firmly determined. Coore notes that
“The Government intends to keep its exchange rate policy under continuous review” due to its
importance in “enabling” it “to meet…balance of payments targets.”82 However, some examples
of elements of the policy were “full provision for the payment of the interest and debt service
charges due on its own foreign debt and on any guaranteed debt” as well as for “all other
Government foreign payments.” The government also noted that foreign exchange would be
available to pay for imports based on “the payments schedule set out in the imports license.”83
In addition to the conditionalities that accompanied the receipt of the second and third tranches
of the loan, the IMF arranged the agreement to entail quarterly check-ins by the IMF. This served
to ensure that Jamaica was meeting the “performance criteria”.84 In line with the agreement, such
an assessment was made in January of 1978. However, Jamaica failed the domestic assets test.85
Consequently, the island did not continue to receive funds under the 1977 agreement.
Due to these developments, the Jamaican government set out to sign a new agreement with the
IMF in early 1978. This time, the IMF sent “a team of six” to Jamaica to negotiate with Minister
David Coore and other Jamaican policy makers.86 Unlike the 1977 negotiations, the negotiations
for the 1978 arrangement saw agreement between the government and the Fund arise relatively
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quickly. Negotiations began in January of 1978 after the failed test resulted in the suspension of
the 1977 agreement. By the 24th of February 1978, the Finance Ministry announced that it had
reached a preliminary agreement with the IMF for an extended fund facility.
This relatively quick emergence of agreement between both sides is intriguing especially given
the extended negotiations before the 1977 agreement. It was probably due to the nation’s
precarious economic situation. With soaring inflation and worsening balance of payments and
fiscal deficits, the government was in dire need of financing. It is important to remember that this
crisis existed because of a lack of alternative sources of funds. Therefore, not only was it likely
that the government would not receive funds from other entities but even if they did, the cost of
these funds – manifested in the interest rate accompanying the financing – would have been
unworkably high. Therefore, it could not help but seek loans from the IMF. This highlights the
important point that in many cases, the IMF is a lender of last resort for countries. Because of
this, the countries that often seek funding from the IMF are particularly vulnerable and desperate.
Therefore, even in the face of IMF conditionality that is unreasonably harsh, their leaders tend to
accept these conditions because of the desperate condition which the country faces rather than
because of agreement with the policies themselves.
This is important for three main reasons. Firstly, because the IMF’s policies often negatively
affect the economies of the countries in which they are implemented, it is important to
understand that a major source of the economic disorder is because of the IMF, and not solely the
country’s leaders. This allows for more accurate attribution of responsibility for these economic
disasters. Secondly, considering the motivations of these historical actors – political leaders and
the IMF – aids the researcher and the reader in understanding why events unfolded as they did,
as opposed to just the fact that they unfolded as they did. This is important because this
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understanding of ‘why’ as opposed to just ‘what’ is a fundamental purpose of historical research
and analysis. Finally, understanding why these crises occur may increase the probability that
measures will be taken to rectify the true underlying causes and to mitigate against potential risks
to prevent their recurrence.
In the Jamaican case, desperation may not have been the reason for which talks with the IMF
were accelerated. The agreement may have been accelerated simply because the Fund and the
Jamaican government had already entered into an agreement prior, and as such had a generally
greater understanding of each other’s desires and incentives going into the 1978 negotiations as
opposed to those in 1977. Nonetheless, this brief digression observing the weakened bargaining
power of many IMF debtors is an essential one.
As noted earlier, the government reached a preliminary agreement with the IMF in February of
1978 for a new loan after the country’s failure of the domestic assets test resulted in the
discontinuation of the 1977 agreement. Official IMF records note that a formal agreement was
formed between Jamaica and the IMF for the provision of an extended fund facility (EFF) on the
9th of June 1978. It was to expire on June 10 of the following year.87 On Tuesday, July 25, 1978,
The Daily Gleaner published documentation “relating to the agreement between the Government
of Jamaica and the International Monetary Fund” which was “tabled in the House of
Representatives”. This documentation included “a letter and memorandum on the Jamaican
economy to the Managing Director of the I.M.F. setting out the arrangements and establishing
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conditions for the purchase of Special Drawing Rights; and telegrams from the I.M.F. to the
Bank of Jamaica indicating the approval of the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund.”88
The 1978 agreement was an extended fund facility as opposed to a standby arrangement like in
1977. Simply put, an extended fund facility is a longer-term arrangement between the IMF and
the debtor nation. More specifically, according to the IMF, “When a country faces serious
medium-term balance of payments problems because of structural weaknesses that require time
to address, the IMF can assist through an Extended Fund Facility.” 89 Alternatively, standby
arrangements are centered around shorter-term adjustments. This is noteworthy primarily
because it marks the beginning of a longer-term dependency of Jamaica on financing from the
IMF and other multilateral lending institutions. This was implicitly acknowledged in an IMF
document published in the local newspaper in 1978. It said that “Jamaica has decided to recast its
economic programme into a medium-term framework designed to reverse the economic decline
of recent years and restore equilibrium in the balance of payments.”90
As with the 1977 agreement, considering the policies that the 1978 agreement entailed is key to
the later analysis in this chapter. The policies of the 1978 agreement were largely in line with
those of the 1977 agreement. They surrounded incomes, foreign exchange, and fiscal policy, in
addition to balance of payments and monetary policy. In terms of its structure, it provided 200
million SDRs to the government of Jamaica to be purchased in multiple tranches. Additionally,
according to the official IMF documentation surrounding the arrangement, it appears that the
deal was structured in three tranches – in line with the three years for which the agreement was
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supposed to last. The documentation suggests that the first purchase of foreign exchange from
the IMF was to be made in September of 1978 while the second and third purchases were to be
made in June of 1979 and 1980 respectively.
Importantly, these purchases were accompanied by conditionalities. For example, the document
notes that:
“During any period until June 30, 1979, in respect of which (1) the net bank credit to the public
sector exceeded the ceiling specified… (2) the net domestic assets of the Bank of Jamaica
exceeded the ceiling specified… (3) the net foreign assets of the Bank of Jamaica did not reach
the targets specified…Jamaica will not request any purchase under the extended arrangement
after September 30, 1978….”91
This means that to receive foreign exchange from the IMF after the first tranche of the loan was
distributed, the government and the Central Bank would have to ensure that certain metrics of
economic performance were achieved or adhered to. The document further notes that the
Jamaican economy would face “annual reviews, jointly with the International Monetary Fund”
for the purpose of assessing “the progress made in the implementation of the programme”.92
Additionally, aside from the conditionalities related to wages, incomes, and other economic
metrics, the 1978 deal incorporated devaluations. “Senator Richard Fletcher told the
Senate…that if the wage guidelines are breached during the period of economic recovery…the
whole package could not hold and further devaluation would follow.”93 This is important because
it illustrates the substantial role of devaluations in the IMF’s programmes with Jamaica – one of
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the substantial points which will be later shown to have driven the implementation of unsuitable
economic policy in the early 1990s.
In addition to the policies associated with the agreement, it is also important to consider the
attitudes of various social and economic actors and factions towards these IMF agreements. As
already noted, these insights are important not only because of their narrative historical value in
relaying what happened but in explaining why it happened as it did. This quest to know ‘why’, is
one of the fundamental bases of historical research and analysis. Unfortunately, there is limited
information regarding this subject for the 1977 agreement. However, there appears to be
meaningfully more insight into this as it relates to the 1978 agreement.
There are especially more opinions of members of the general public than of other ‘actors’ such
as politicians and businesspeople. This is potentially because of most Jamaicans having had an
idea of what living under the IMF regime was like. Whereas in 1977, Jamaicans had never
experienced the effects of austerity measures, they began to feel the impacts of such policies
even in the few months for which the 1977 agreement lasted. This made them more likely to
react to news of the agreement in 1978. Having experienced high inflation, wage cuts, and
unemployment – direct effects of the IMF’s austerity measures, the Jamaican public possessed
largely negative sentiments towards the arrangement. The primary areas of concern were the
inflationary impacts of the agreement, the limits put on wages, the raging inflation that reduced
their spending power daily, and the island’s sovereignty.94 For example, in February 1978, not
long before the agreement was signed, a portion of the “Opinions” section of The Daily Gleaner
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was dedicated to the “Voice of the People”. Of the six letters written in the section, three focused
on criticizing the IMF.
One of these letters, titled ‘No to IMF’ and written by Wesley Hughes notes that “The IMF…has
demonstrated once again that it does not defend the interest of the third world countries in
general and Jamaica in particular. It did so by forcing us to devalue our currency because we
failed by 2.6% to meet one of the stringent targets set by that institution.” Hughes also refers to
the IMF’s actions as a “display of callousness” in addition to criticizing the Jamaican
government for agreeing to the IMF arrangement. This note of national sovereignty which was
discussed earlier is also evident in Hughes’ letter. He says, “the only plan that will be operative if
we are caught in the IMF system of dependency is the IMF plan”.95 This shows that among at
least some members of the public, the idea of being dependent on the IMF, and submitting to the
austerity measures which it proposed was undesirable.
Another letter, written by a Glenroy Mellish, criticizes the IMF’s devaluation policy particularly
because of its inflationary impact, and the negative implications of this inflationary impact for
the purchasing power of the Jamaican populace. Just as harshly as Hughes, he states that the
lesson to be drawn from devaluation is “that President Carter, Mr. Andrew Young and the IMF
have no good intentions for Jamaica.” 96 He also refers to “the IMF and US imperialism” as “our
real enemy”.97 Of course, other examples of public commentary are available, but these letters
sufficiently exhibit some of the public sentiment towards the IMF and its policy. They strongly
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suggest the effect of the IMF’s policies on the lives of the people, especially since little to no
criticism from the public existed towards the IMF before the 1977 agreement.
In addition to the public, there is the government’s response. At least publicly, Prime Minister
Michael Manley appeared to be in support of the agreement. Several labor unions called for “a
re-negotiation of the conditions of the agreement” by the ruling party at the time – the People’s
National Party. However, Manley noted that “the guidelines were necessary to maximize the
amount of money in the Capital Budget and maximize its productive capacity”.98 It is likely that
Manley supported the deal because of the desperation of the economic situation. Seeing that the
country’s economic prospects and condition became progressively bleaker each day, even if
Manley disagreed with some of the terms which accompanied the agreement, he would have
rationally put those aside for the sake of the country’s economic survival. Limited information is
available regarding the attitudes of other ministers in the ruling party towards the agreement.
However, since politicians such as Senator Richard Fletcher, Finance Minister David Coore, and
Minister Coore’s eventual replacement, Minister Eric Bell, were instrumental in negotiating the
deal and presenting it in Parliament, it is likely that they too supported it given the economic
state of the country. Another reason for which the government likely supported the plan is that
they saw it as an opportunity to build the country’s financial profile and eventually access
funding from alternate sources. That this was a consideration in the government’s decision to
borrow from the IMF is evident in the Ministry Paper associated with the 1977 IMF agreement.
In it, Minister Coore says, “One of the advantages which derives from an endorsement by the
Fund of the Government’s economic programme is the willingness of foreign Governments,

98

“IMF pact approved by House,” The Daily Gleaner, May 19, 1978, 1.

51

international institutions and private financial institutions to accept this endorsement as an
indication…which would justify these institutions in making assistance and credits available.99”
Finally, there is limited information about the attitude of the business community towards the
deal. However, at least some members of the business community appeared to be in favor of the
deal. For example, Mr. Winston Mahfood, president of the Jamaica Manufacturers’ Association,
expressed his support for the Government’s “decision to negotiate the US$240 million with the
IMF” during a meeting with other members of the organization. He also criticized individuals
“for their condemnation of the Government and their determination to gain their political
objectives at all cost”. 100 Mahfood cited the terms of the deal as being necessary to restore
economic health to Jamaica. Although he was only one individual among many businesspeople
and corporate leaders in Jamaica at the time, it is likely that many of the same aspects of the
agreement which he would have found to be beneficial would have also been beneficial to other
businesses. Thus, although his statement does not provide indubitable evidence, it is still useful
to highlight it.
Jamaica after the 1977 and 1978 IMF Agreements
Despite entering these IMF programs, Jamaica’s economic performance and condition continued
to deteriorate. Between December of 1977 and 1978, prices rose astronomically, manifested in
an inflation rate of 49.4%. During the same period between 1978 and 1979, inflation rose by
nearly 20%. Inflation of this same magnitude was again observed between December 1979 and
December 1980. Other metrics of economic health such as GDP growth and unemployment were
equally unimpressive. For instance, GDP growth was about -1.8% in 1979, and nearly -6% in
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1980. The unemployment rate in 1980 was nearly 27% after having exceeded 30% in the
preceding year.101
Amid this economic deterioration and worsening socio-political conditions, the Jamaica Labor
Party (JLP) ousted the PNP in a landslide victory in the General Elections in October of 1980.
Shortly after coming to power, the new JLP government led by Prime Minister Edward Seaga set
out to sign a new IMF agreement in 1981. The terms of this deal appear to be somewhat different
from the first two. Whereas the government and the media more generally provided greater detail
regarding the first two deals, the details surrounding the negotiations of this deal appear to be
opaquer. However, the terms of the agreement were made available to the Jamaican populace
after being presented in Parliament. The deal was an extended fund facility of “SDR 477.7
million” which was being joined to Jamaica’s balance of “SDR 21.8 million” from a previous
agreement. This made for a total of SDR 499.5 million in loan funds over a three-year period.
The agreement further allowed the government to immediately access funds to purchase imports.
Unlike the two preceding agreements, the 1981 arrangement appears to place more emphasis on
economic growth. In presenting the deal in Parliament, Prime Minister Seaga stated, “We
propose to make the fiscal year 1981/82 the year when the economy goes back on a growth path.
We are aiming for real growth of 5%...with targets of 4% for 1982/83 and 5% for 1983/84.” The
Prime Minister expected the projected growth to come from putting “underutilized capacity to
work”. He notes that “Utilization of manufacturing capacity is now below 40 per cent” and that
“hotel capacity is at 45 per cent of capacity”. Given this, Seaga stated that the government would
focus on promoting exports and tourism because the country would only be able to rectify its
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balance of payments problems by “increasing its exports of goods and services at a much faster
pace than the growth in imports”.102
The other aspects of the deal focused on stabilization of the fiscal budget, moderating
compensation to public sector employees – whose wages represented “76 per cent of tax revenue
and 61 per cent of current expenditure” between 1980 and 1981 and limiting the “Bank Credit
available to the public sector”. Finally, of note, the agreement contained no provision for
devaluation of the Jamaican dollar. 103
Despite the verbal emphasis on growth, Jamaica saw little. For example, though the growth of
2.6% in 1981 was an improvement from what was seen in the previous year, it was
underwhelming, particularly given that Jamaica possessed a developing economy as opposed to a
developed one.104 The following year, in 1982, economic growth was even lower (1.2%), again
representing little benefit from the island’s agreement with the IMF. This aids in showing that
even when the IMF’s policies were supposedly aimed at stimulating the growth of the Jamaican
economy, they were ineffective in doing so. This suggests that the inability of these programs to
spur economic recovery in Jamaica were due to inherent flaws in their approach even more than
to a lack of verbal emphasis on economic growth.
The 1981 extended fund facility was to expire in 1984. However, just shortly before expiring in
1984, Jamaica failed one of the IMF’s tests in late 1983. This prevented it from drawing
“on…74.9 million SDR…even though the amount was already allocated to the country.”105 That
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this amount was not drawn is also obvious in the IMF’s official records which state that with the
1981 extended fund facility, the Jamaican government was allotted 477,700 SDRs but ultimately,
Jamaica only drew 402,800 SDRs.106
After this agreement was made, the government continued to sign standby arrangements with the
IMF beginning in 1984 until the next extended fund facility was signed in 1992. These
agreements were essentially the same as the prior agreements with Jamaica. They focused
primarily on building foreign currency reserves, reducing the fiscal deficit through wage cuts and
other cost cuts, and improving the balance of payments in addition to gradually deregulating the
country’s import regime.
Insufficient Focus on Production and Economic Growth
This chapter’s stated goal is to link the IMF’s policies to the liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign
exchange regime in 1991 and its attendant high interest rate policy. Therefore, having provided
several examples of the IMF’s arrangements with Jamaica, they must now be analyzed to show
how the IMF’s policies influenced the liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime and
the implementation of the attendant high interest rate policy.
The first way in which their influence is evident is in the lack of emphasis, or even attention,
exhibited by these arrangements towards stimulating economic growth and development in
Jamaica. As is evident in from the examples discussed, the primary focus of the deals that
Jamaica signed with the IMF was on increasing the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves,
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cutting fiscal spending, restricting wages, increasing taxes, and devaluation – which will be
discussed separately.
As noted by scholar Catherine Codjoe, “no country can continue ad infinitum to finance a large
volume of its imports by loans and gifts.”107 Consequently, countries facing a significant balance
of payments deficit must address it to ensure that they develop the ability to sustainably produce
enough goods and services to finance their imports. A country’s balance of payments can simply
be calculated as the value of its exports less the value of its imports. Therefore, for a country to
improve its balance of payments, it must decrease imports, increase exports, or do both. This
improvement in the balance of payments then serves to increase the country’s holdings of foreign
exchange by reducing foreign exchange spending, increasing foreign exchange earnings, or by
doing both. Reducing imports is straightforward – the country would simply purchase less from
the rest of the world. Increasing exports is also a relatively simple concept. However, it is more
complicated than decreasing imports because it requires that the nation’s people either consume
less of their current production and sell more of the same amount of current production to the
rest of the world, or that they produce more and sell more to the rest of the world. Of course,
there could also be a mixture of both selling more of current production of goods and services as
well as producing and exporting more goods and service.
Technically, Jamaica’s balance of payments problems existed because the country spent too
much purchasing goods produced by other countries relative to the income that it earned from
the goods it produced and sold. However, in more absolute terms, Jamaica’s economic ailment
lay more in the fact that it earned too little than that it spent too much. During the late 1970s and
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especially the late 1980s, the island’s imports were primarily of essential products. Therefore,
imports could not be reduced meaningfully. If imports could not be reduced meaningfully, that
meant that the only way to improve the balance of payments would have been to increase
exports. However, to increase exports, the nation would have had to have increased production
or to consume less of what it produced. Notwithstanding, given that the island’s production was
barely sufficient for its people, reducing consumption of what was produced was not a feasible
strategy. This meant that the only feasible strategy to increasing exports would have been
increasing production. Therefore, given that the IMF’s policies did nothing to increase Jamaica’s
production and in some cases could have been said to have decreased it, Jamaica was put in a
position in which it would have been unable to improve its balance of payments.
Regarding the policies’ inefficacy in helping Jamaica to earn more foreign exchange, the IMF’s
policies were characterized by a certain degree of short-termism. This is manifested in its
periodic check-ins with the countries that are subject to its agreements. These period check-ins
serve the purpose of ensuring that the countries’ central bank and government meet certain
performance metrics. Examples of this are the net international reserves of the central bank or the
government’s foreign debt. Importantly, if the country subject to the test fails to meet the
standard of the test, further receipt of funds can be terminated by the IMF. Therefore, unless the
country meets the criteria to pass the test or is granted a waiver in the case of failure, it is likely
that it will have to negotiate a new agreement with the IMF. Given the failure of the prior
agreement compounded by these countries’ urgent needs for funds, it is likely that a new
agreement will contain even harsher terms, leading to greater economic, social and political
turmoil in the nation.

57

In such a situation where the country is being tested on its ability to improve its foreign exchange
earnings and to increase its reserves but is subject to policies that inhibit this very improvement,
it then must look to other means of accessing foreign exchange necessary to meet its needs as
well as to meet the criteria required by the test. In line with this, the Jamaican government began
to implement policies which aimed to access foreign exchange that was earned by Jamaican
companies and Jamaicans but had been diverted away from the official financial system. In
essence, there was a shift in focus from earning to accessing – the fundamental driver of the
eventual liberalization of the exchange rate regime in 1991.
Devaluation
The discussion on how the IMF’s policies in Jamaica were characterized by a lack of focus on
economic growth, and as such encouraged the implementation of disadvantageous policies by the
Jamaican government, is also connected to its programs of currency devaluation in Jamaica. This
is because even when the IMF’s policies did pertain somewhat to increasing Jamaica’s economic
growth and foreign exchange earnings, the policies implemented to have this effect were
inherently inconsistent with the structure of the Jamaican economy and as such they were
ineffective in achieving this goal. In fact, they did substantial damage to the economy. Among
such policies, devaluation of the Jamaican dollar was foremost.
Devaluation is a central tenet of almost all IMF agreements signed with countries facing balance
of payments difficulties. Devaluation of a nation’s currency refers to a deliberate act by its
monetary authorities – the central bank, the government, or both – to reduce the value of the
nation’s currency. This is only possible with currencies whose values are either managed within
a specified range or set to a specific figure by the country’s monetary authorities. For currencies
whose values are completely market-determined, this is not possible because the market value of
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the currency is set purely by supply and demand. As such, these currencies cannot be
devalued.108
The reasoning undergirding the IMF’s decision to employ currency devaluations in Jamaica
surrounds an improvement in the nation’s balance of payments. As explained by scholar Inder
Ruprah, proponents of currency devaluation argue that it will cause locals’ demand for imports
to fall and foreigners’ demand for exports to increase.109 This is premised on the reasoning that a
less valuable currency will make exports cheaper for foreigners and make imports more
expensive for locals. As such, devaluation would, in theory, increase the inflow of foreign
exchange to Jamaica, the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange, thereby rectifying the
balance of payments problem being faced by the island. However, because of Jamaica’s limited
production, and the reliance of its productive sector on imported raw materials, this was an
unfeasible strategy. Furthermore, because such a large portion of the products consumed in the
Jamaican economy were imported, devaluing the Jamaican dollar led to large-scale inflation.
This is evident in the fact that in each month of 1978, the inflation rate was higher than, or at
least equal to, the inflation rate in the same month during 1977. By December of 1978, inflation
since December 1977 had reached almost 50%.110
Aside from the socio-economic implications of this high rate of inflation, this devaluation policy
also had substantial implications for the value of Jamaica’s currency. At the time, Jamaica’s
currency was pegged to the US dollar at “J$1.78 per US dollar. However, while the USA did
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experience bouts of inflation in the late 1970s, rate of inflation was in the range of 10% - 12%
during the same period. This was significantly less than in Jamaica despite it still being high.
Furthermore, US economic growth was in the range of 2%-3% as compared to negative growth
in Jamaica at the same time. 111 Jamaica’s unemployment rate was 26% while the USA’s
unemployment rate was approximately 6%.112 Therefore, apart from inflation rates, the general
stability and prosperity of the economies were worlds apart.
This disparity in the economic prospects of the country but constant official valuation of the two
currencies or the insufficient devaluation of the dollar, fostered the development of a black
market in foreign exchange due to the obvious overvaluation of the Jamaican dollar. A black
market is a colloquial term which refers to an illegal market. This market is generally illegal
because the product(s) on which the market is based is illegal, the way in which the product is
being sold is illegal, or both. According to Professor Asif Dowla in his publication in the
International Economic Journal, black markets in foreign exchange arise due to “overvaluation
of the currency, capital control, and trade restrictions.”113 Effectively all of these were at play in
fostering the development of Jamaica’s black market for foreign exchange. However, this
discussion focuses on overvaluation as that was the primary impact of the IMF’s devaluation
policies.
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Overvaluation is a common feature of pegged exchange rates in countries with high inflation. An
exchange rate is simply the rate at which one country’s currency is exchanged for that of another.
This means that one unit of currency in one country should be able to purchase the amount of
product that can be purchased by its equivalent in the foreign currency. Necessarily, that
equivalent should be able to purchase the same amount of product in the home country as can
one unit of the home country’s currency. When the inflation rate in one country is higher than the
inflation rate in another country but the exchange rate remains the same or adjust insufficiently,
the currency of the country in which the inflation rate is higher becomes overvalued because the
purchasing power of each dollar in the country with the higher inflation rate has decreased
relative to the purchasing power of each dollar in the country with a lower inflation rate. As
such, purchasing a unit of currency of the country with the higher inflation rate would mean
losses in real terms because one would be giving up more purchasing power for less.114
As noted, while there was a differential in the range of several dozen per cent between the
inflation rate in the USA and that in Jamaica, and the general economic conditions in the prior
were substantially more favorable than those in the latter, the exchange rate in Jamaica was
slowly devalued in 1977 and then was pegged to the Jamaican dollar in mid-1978. Jamaica’s
economic growth and unemployment rate were significantly less favorable than that of the USA,
and its inflation rate significantly outpaced the USA’s. Thus, although the value of the Jamaican
dollar in real terms (purchasing power) had decreased significantly relative to that of the US
dollar, the rate of exchange between both currencies had barely changed because it was pegged
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to the dollar by Jamaican monetary authorities. This meant that when exporters earned foreign
exchange or when individuals received or earned foreign exchange from abroad, selling this
foreign exchange to the Bank of Jamaica at the official rate of exchange would have meant
significant losses in real terms given that the amount of product that could be purchased by the
US dollars being sold was meaningfully more than the amount of product that could be
purchased with the Jamaican dollars being received. Thus, neither businesses nor individuals
would want to sell their foreign exchange to the central bank at the official rate. Therefore, they
sold it on the black market at a higher rate, receiving more Jamaican dollars for every US dollar
than they would have received in the official market.
Jamaica’s official foreign exchange markets began to suffer from the effects of a black market in
the late 1970s in light of socio-political and economic turmoil compounded by capital controls
implemented by the government. For example, columnist David Dacosta speaks to those who
migrated from Jamaica in the late 1970s amid the deteriorating socio-economic conditions. He
noted that these individuals had two choices regarding places to change their Jamaican dollars
into US dollars. These were “the Bank of Jamaica or the Black Market. The Bank offered an
excellent rate of exchange and the good word of the State that…those savings could leave. The
black market offered a murderous rate of exchange but an immediate exit for the money.”115
Discussions of the political climate at the time aside, this makes it evident that the black market
at least existed and was a part of public knowledge. It is also noteworthy that the reference to a
“murderous rate of exchange” on the black market illustrates the point that the rate of conversion
from US dollars to Jamaican dollars was higher on the black market. In the same way that
individuals converting earned US dollars to Jamaican dollars would have found that they could
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have sold these US dollars for more Jamaican dollars on the black market, those that were
converting Jamaican dollars to US dollars would have had to have given up more Jamaican
dollars for each US dollar that they purchased.
The government’s awareness and focus on the black market in foreign exchange is evident
throughout the 1980s. For example, shortly after Jamaica signed a new IMF agreement in 1981,
Prime Minister Seaga in his address to Parliament, stated that one of the adjustments to the
system of import licensing was to “erode the black market”. Although he does not explain the
workings of the policy in depth, the reference to the implementation of policies specifically
aimed at eroding the black market suggests that it was an important factor in the workings of the
economy – particularly in the flow of foreign exchange – and also an important factor in
government economic policymaking. Another columnist, the late, distinguished professor of
sociology at the University of the West Indies, Carl Stone, noted the impact of the prices of US
dollars on the black market influencing the prices being charged to consumers by businesses. As
such, it appears that the black market was not only an issue of concern to the government but
also an important element of social discourse. 116
Given this, the government began to implement currency related policies in 1981 aimed at
directing currency from the black market as well as from other into the official commercial
banking system. These, along with other currency-related policies are discussed in the next
section of the paper.
Economic Destabilization
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Aside from the overvaluation of Jamaica’s exchange rate, another important role of devaluation
of the Jamaican dollar in motivating the implementation of the currency liberalization and high
interest rate policies is the destabilization of the Jamaican economy. This is somewhat ironic in
that IMF agreements are supposed to serve as ‘stabilizers’ to the economies of the countries with
which they are made. However, because of the inconsistencies of some of the terms of these
policies with the economic structure of the countries in which they are implemented, they have
no effect at best and damaging at worst. This was the impact of devaluation in Jamaica. As
explained, devaluation had this impact because although it was designed to stimulate exports and
to stabilize the Jamaican economy, it instead caused high inflation and destabilized the economy.
However, in addition to devaluation, several IMF policies entailed higher prices, higher taxes,
wage cuts, public sector job cuts, and other policies aimed at suppressing aggregate demand and
limiting fiscal spending. Nonetheless, instead of rectifying Jamaica’s balance of payments’
difficulties, many of these policies – especially inflation, resulted in widespread destabilization
of the Jamaican economy.
Consequently, individuals were wary of holding Jamaican dollars. This, like the sale of foreign
exchange on the black market, exacerbated the shortage of foreign exchange in Jamaica. Because
of this, the Jamaican government had to implement policies aimed at diverting foreign exchange
from the black market to the official system as well as to direct holdings of foreign exchange that
were overseas or elsewhere into the official financial system.
Between May of 1978 and November of 1983, the Jamaican dollar was pegged to the US dollar
“at J$1.78 per U.S. dollar”.117 As explained previously, this economic terminology of ‘pegging’
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simply refers to the exchange rate between Jamaican dollars and US dollars being set at a fixed
rate by Jamaica’s monetary authorities – the central bank and the government. However, on
April 22, 1981, the Bank of Jamaica announced a “‘Special Retained Account…for approved
importers.” This program allowed individuals who were certified importers to “maintain and
operate in a commercial bank in Jamaica, an account in foreign currency designated ‘Special
Retained Account’.” This account was then to be used to pay for imports into Jamaica. Although
the government authorized this account, and the account would be held in the official financial
system – in a commercial bank, “The procurement of foreign exchange for credit of the Special
Retained Account” was “the responsibility of the ‘approved importer’ ”.118 Given the shortage of
foreign exchange in the official system, it appears that system was aimed at diverting foreign
exchange from the black market to the official market. Even though it didn’t change the price of
foreign exchange on the official market to make it more competitive with foreign exchange on
the black market, it allowed importers to purchase foreign exchange on the black market and
then to deposit it into these special accounts. In this context, it is also noteworthy that one of the
prohibited sources of the foreign exchange that was to be deposited in the account was
“payments for exports”. Foreign exchange earned from payments for exports, among several
other prohibited sources was still “to be sold to the Bank of Jamaica or a local commercial bank
for Jamaican dollars and is not available for credit to a ‘Special Retained Account.’ ”119
Another policy implemented by the Government which adjusted the foreign exchange system
was a “Three-tier exchange rate arrangement”. This policy came into being in January 1983. The
system was based on an “official” rate, an “official parallel” rate, and “a third rate applied to
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most CARICOM transactions.120 The purpose of this multi-tiered foreign exchange system was
to provide a favorable rate at which payment for “private debt”, “basic foods, petroleum and
petroleum products, essential imports for the tourist sector, schoolbooks, drugs, infant”, among
others, could be made. Prime Minister Seaga makes it clear that the implementation of this multitiered system was in response to the black market. He notes that “For some time there has existed
alongside the official Foreign Exchange Market, an informal market which has been increasing
in significance in recent times. Attempts have been made to tap this market…but this…has
proven to be inefficient”. To overcome these problems related to the black market, “and to
ensure that the resources available within the market are more efficiently utilized,” the
government decided to “formalize the parallel market.” The system worked based on a
mechanism whereby individuals who had foreign exchange to sell would sell it to the
commercial banks who would no longer contract with these individuals at an exchange rate set
by the Bank of Jamaica but instead at a rate set by each bank “determined by demand and
supply”.121 Thus, this would reduce the incentive for these individuals to sell their foreign
currency on the black market because they would be able to sell the currency at a similar rate
into the official system without the risks associated with illegal activities.
Notwithstanding the implementation of this system, Jamaica’s official financial system
continued to suffer from a dearth of foreign exchange because of the black market. One potential
reason for this is noted in the document which Prime Minister Seaga tabled in the House of
Representatives. It notes that although the parallel rate was established, certain businesses such
as “hotels…Rent-a-Car agencies, and tour operators” would be required to sell their foreign
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exchange earnings to the central bank at the official rate. Given the higher rates which were
available in the black market, it is likely that these businesses would have sold at least some of
their earned foreign exchange on the black market rather than simply at the official rate. This
would have continued to preclude the government from accessing and allocating the foreign
exchange being earned by Jamaica. As such, even with some form of liberalization by delegating
the purchase of foreign exchange to commercial banks at a market-determined rate, there were
still strong incentives for foreign exchange to be sold on the black market.
In November of 1983, the central bank eliminated the dual exchange rate system, and the
Governor of the Central Bank issued an order under the “Bank of Jamaica Act” to establish “the
new rate of parity” “between the Jamaican dollar and the American dollar”. This order created a
unified system at a new rate of J$3.15 to USD$1.122 Despite the implementation of the dual
exchange rate earlier in the year, it was found that “the ‘street’ market” had “grown in size while
the flows at the disposal of the banks” were “insufficient to meet the needs of the market”.123
Because of the continued “leakages of foreign exchange from the system and increase in the
amount of foreign exchange required for the purchase of raw materials, construction materials,
machinery”, and so forth, the parallel system was replaced by a unified system. This “unified”
system was the aforementioned singular rate of J$3.15 to USD$1.
Shortly after this system was instituted in November, an auction system in which the exchange
rate “was allowed for float within a band” was introduced.124 In the following year, further
liberalization occurred in which the exchange rate was allowed to float freely for a brief period
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during November 1984. However, in the same month, that system was discontinued, and an
auction system was established whereby importers would bid on foreign exchange as needed in
periodic auctions held by Bank of Jamaica. This auction system remained in place until 1987
when the government began to liberalize the exchange rate regime.
In 1987, the road towards permanent liberalization of the exchange rate regime began when in
July, “Exchange control for all current transactions” was “delegated to commercial banks”. This
allowed individuals to purchase foreign exchange for the business travel, vacation, medical
expenses, among a few other purposes. For example, given that applicants submitted “a letter
signed by the chief executive of the company or institution” with which their travel was
associated, “valid passport with visa or entry certificate tickets for passage or flight and
letter…inviting the applicant to attend the particular conference”, they would be allowed to
purchase foreign exchange from commercial banks. Vacation “travel allowance of US$56
(J$308) a year was increased to US$150 (J$825) per person.”125 Although this policy does not
directly relate to diverting foreign currency from the black market to the official system, it can be
said somewhat to have played the role of attracting greater foreign exchange inflows to Jamaica
by inspiring confidence in the government’s ability to allow for the freer movement of capital
and thus in the idea that the government would not act with undue power towards foreign
exchange brought into the nation by others. Thus, again it represents the government loosening
foreign exchange controls to rectify the island’s shortage of foreign exchange.
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The next substantial adjustment made to the foreign exchange regime in Jamaica was partial
liberalization of the foreign exchange regime which was the final step before full liberalization in
1991.
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, in September of 1990, Acting Prime Minister, P.J.
Patterson presented a new exchange rate regime which was to be implemented. In his speech,
Patterson further stated that:
“In recent months, the official exchange market has been in a state of severe disequilibrium.
Foreign exchange flows which should normally enter the Bank of Jamaica have been diverted to
the illegal street market…Previously we operated a fixed exchange rate which required forming
a judgement as to the equilibrium rate and adjusting it periodically. The Government has decided
to discontinue this and to move instead to an exchange system where the rate prevailing from
time to time will reflect the underlying forces of demand and supply”.
Under this system, foreign exchange transactions would occur between the public and Jamaica’s
commercial banks. Furthermore, commercial banks would hold the foreign exchange that they
purchased from the public rather than selling it to the Bank of Jamaica. In effect, they would
“buy and sell for their own account”. 126
As in all previous cases of foreign exchange adjustment in Jamaica, the primary reason for which
this change to the operation of the foreign exchange regime occurred was that foreign exchange
being earned by Jamaicans and Jamaican businesses was being funneled into the black market.
Some of the serious implications that this had were that it prevented businesses that imported
goods from paying for imports due to a lack of sufficient foreign exchange and prevented the

126

“De-regulation and the IMF”, The Daily Gleaner, September 13, 1990, 23.

69

government from servicing its debt payments that were to be made in foreign currency. As stated
by Patterson “at the end of August 1990”, “official and commercial arrears relating to foreign
payments amounted to US$268 million”.127 This meant that between the Jamaican government
and Jamaican businesses, there were previously due payments in excess of US$260 million that
were yet to be made. This represents the seriousness of the situation. It shows that directing
foreign exchange flows from the black market to the official system was a matter of economic
survival, not just improvement or ambition. It is also to be noted that the government was again
seeking IMF assistance at this time, and it submitted a “Letter of Intent” to “the management of
the Fund” which included Jamaica’s plans regarding the alteration of the foreign exchange
regime. For clarity, a Letter of Intent to the IMF is a “Letter from a government to the IMF
outlining planned economic reforms to be made in relation to receiving an IMF loan. It
includes…conditions that must be implemented to access the IMF’s resources”.128
Economic Liberalization
Supplementing all these policies was an ideology of economic liberalization on the part of the
IMF. Therefore, the final reason for which the IMF’s policies can be said to have been the
driving force behind the government’s currency liberalization and high interest rate policies of
the 1990s was that the IMF and the World Bank espoused a policy of liberalization that they
began to implement in Jamaica in the late 1980s. On account of this, the Jamaican government
would have been motivated to suggest policies concerning further liberalization in order to gain
funds from the IMF and the World Bank. As was noted by Patterson, the announcement made in
1990 was a part of a Letter of Intent sent to the IMF by Jamaica’s Ministry of Finance, seeking
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new funds. Additionally, because Jamaica’s pegged exchange rate, but high inflation rate, were
inconsistent with each other and fostered an overvalued currency, liberalization was a de facto
devaluation of the Jamaican dollar. Given the IMF’s affinity to such policies, it is likely that such
a policy would have been in favor with it.
Economic liberalization was an important element of the IMF’s strategy in Jamaica. Aside from
foreign exchange liberalization, this included financial liberalization and trade liberalization.
Most importantly, this is evident in the various agreements made between Jamaican and the
Fund, in addition to other institutions like the World Bank which worked with the Fund in
Jamaica. This was also noted by a lecturer from the University of the West Indies, Richard
Bernal, during a lecture which he gave in June 1985 during Trade Union Week. He notes that the
IMF’s “adjustment programmes” consist of 3 basic policies – “Devaluation…Deflation”, and
“Deregulation”. This deregulation referred to by Bernal is economic liberalization. He describes
it as “a policy of removal of (a) price controls; (b) rent controls; (c) import restrictions; and (d)
exchange controls.” It is important to note that Bernal’s description of some IMF policies
throughout his lecture may have been biased by his stance against the organization’s proposed
wage controls. This stance is evident firstly in his policy recommendations during the lecture
which are directly opposed to the IMF’s: 1. “Wage increases should be indexed to cost of living
increases” and 2. “The national minimum wage must be indexed to cost of living increases.” 129
This directly opposes the IMF’s recommendation that wages increases by the public sector were
to be restricted to a rate of increase that was unrelated to the cost of living. He also states that the
IMF institutes such policies so that “the victim of the process” can be “blamed for having caused
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the problem.” Notwithstanding Bernal’s obvious biases, his description of economic
liberalization, or deregulation in his words, can be judged to be reasonably accurate.
Aside from in Jamaica, liberalization was a significant characteristic of the IMF’s agreements
with developing countries between the 1970s and the 1990s. As explained by Bernal, economic
liberalization effectively refers to the concept of removing government or other institutional
controls which control various segments of the economy which could be otherwise determined
by a free market. For example, the governments of some countries determine the various interest
rates charged by different financial institutions as well as the amount of money that these
institutions can lend to businesses and to the general populace. One example of such a country is
Jamaica, the government of which set minimum interest rates and credit ceilings for domestic
banks before such policies were removed under the influence of the World Bank and the IMF
between the 1980s and the 1990s. In this case, Jamaica’s financial system would be referred to as
repressed. The IMF would encourage Jamaica to adopt a policy of financial liberalization in
which the market of borrowers and lenders would determine interest rates and in which this free
market of borrowers and sellers would determine how much money would be borrowed and lent
through the forces of supply and demand.
The IMF encourages policies of liberalization based on the reasoning that market-determined
economic outcomes are more efficient and desirable than those determined by governments or
other authorities. These more desirable outcomes are manifested, for instance, in a higher
standard of living in countries that have liberalized the various segments of their economies. For
example, in discussing the benefits of trade liberalization, the IMF notes that:
“No country in recent decades has achieved economic success, in terms of substantial increases
in living standards for its people, without being open to the rest of the world. In contrast, trade
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opening (along with opening to foreign direct investment) has been an important element in the
economic success of East Asia, where the average import tariff has fallen from 30 percent to 10
percent over the past 20 years.”130
It is also important to note that the IMF implemented many of its liberalization policies and
programs in conjunction with other international financial institutions such as the World Bank.
This is illustrated to some extent by the Trade and Financial Sector Adjustment Loans which
were loans provided by the World Bank to Jamaica for the purpose of supporting “the
Government’s trade and financial sector reform program.” Trade reforms under this were
intended to “reduce protection and make it more uniform across sectors and subsectors” and to
“increase competition and the efficiency of enterprises”. Finally, financial sector reforms were
intended to “strengthen the means for managing monetary policy, improve the regulatory
framework” and increase the efficiency of capital allocation.
This loan can be said to have played an important role in the liberalization of the foreign
exchange regime in September of 1991. The document seeking approval for this loan was sent to
the executive directors of the World Bank in February 1991. Although the stated purpose of this
loan was to facilitate the reform of the foreign trade and financial sectors, the last sentence in the
“Loan Description” element of the document states that “The loan would finance general imports
subject to certain restrictions”. Therefore, although the loan’s terms state that the loan was for
the purpose of sectoral reform (trade and financial), it was also be used to finance imports. This
is especially important because of the constant shortage of foreign exchange being faced by
Jamaica. Additionally, some of the other stated uses of the loan such as supporting the
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improvement of “the regulatory framework and supervision of financial institutions”, making
“the allocation of financial resources more efficient”, and reducing trade protections do not
appear to be activities that would have required significant sums of money. As such, the
government would have likely dedicated a meaningful portion of the loan funds to import
purchases. Given this, the government would have been likely to engage in policies that would
have been in line with the World Bank’s desires.
Also important is that there is a section of the document named “Collaboration with the IMF”. It
notes that the Jamaican economy, at the time, was being run based on IMF policies and noted
that it expected that an IMF arrangement “would be in place at the time” when the loan would be
reviewed and disbursed. It also notes that “The IMF and the Bank have been closely
collaborating in the preparation of the medium-term macroeconomic framework” and that they
expect that “such effective collaboration will be maintained in the future.”131
This collaboration is important to note because even though many of the policies that affected
the economy and contributed meaningfully to the financial crisis were implemented based on
IMF conditionality, several of the liberalization initiatives which were taken out in the 1980s
were financed and otherwise facilitated by the World Bank and its funds. The aforementioned
Trade and Financial Sector Adjustment Loans were one such arrangement. This was important
because these policies were also accompanied by conditionalities which impacted the economy.
That these loans were accompanied by conditionalities is evident seeing that the word
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“conditionality” is itself mentioned five times in the document, one of which is in the title of a
dedicated sectioned named “Macroeconomic conditionality”. 132
This section, “Macroeconomic conditionality” highlights the final element of the IMF’s and the
World Bank’s role in the implementation of foreign exchange liberalization in 1990. The section
states that “Second tranche conditionality would be that Jamaica maintained an acceptable
overall macroeconomic policy in accordance with its Medium-Term Economic Framework of
February 27, 1990…for 1990/91-1992/93, set out in its Letter on Economic Policy Adjustment
(Annex VI). The Medium-Term Economic Framework spells out Jamaica's macroeconomic and
sectoral policy agenda, growth and balance of payments prospects and external financing
requirements.” It also states that “The exchange rate system would continue to be marketdetermined and exchange rate policy would be flexible to achieve the objectives of increasing
foreign exchange reserves without additional import or foreign exchange controls.” In Annex VI
of the document, the letter on Economic Policy Adjustment from Jamaica’s Ministry of Finance
states that “A stand-by Agreement with the International Monetary fund for financial year
1990/91, is in effect. In the context of the Stand-by arrangement, the Government has concluded
that new initiatives, involving further deregulation of the of the economy must be
implemented…To this end, the Government has moved to a foreign exchange system that
ensures a market-determined rate.”133
These few sentences highlight several important points. Firstly, there is the fact that a marketdetermined exchange rate would have to be maintained for Jamaica to receive funds under this
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system. This exemplifies, in the World Bank’s own words, that a market-determined exchange
rate was a conditionality for the loan. In addition, it is noteworthy that the letter written by
Jamaica’s Ministry of Finance notes that the partial exchange rate liberalization implemented in
1990 was implemented to the end of further deregulation of the economy which was a program
assumed “in the context of” the government’s agreement with the IMF. This illustrates two
important ideas. Firstly, that the currency deregulation already in place – since 1990 – was a
conditionality of the IMF loan given that it was an element of the further deregulations taken “in
the context” of the IMF agreement. Secondly, it suggests that these discussions concerning the
deregulation of the currency entailed potential further deregulations. This is because the letter
speaks about further deregulation. This means that whatever deregulation had occurred was not
all that was intended. Of course, the remaining deregulation could have referred to financial and
trade deregulation. However, there is a substantial chance that it referred to currency
deregulation. In addition, the letter states that the new foreign exchange system “ensures a
market determined rate”, not that it was a market-based system. Therefore, given the
government’s commitment to the IMF, to further deregulation, it is likely that the IMF’s
arrangement was conditioned on further deregulation of the foreign exchange regime.
The second, and arguably more important point that it highlights is that the exchange rate regime
was “to be flexible to achieve the objectives of increasing foreign exchange reserves without
additional import or foreign exchange controls.” This means that in the case that Jamaica began
to face increasing shortages of foreign exchange, it would not be able to reverse its policy of
liberalization, like in 1984, to rectify the shortage that occurred. Therefore, the flexibility that
would have to be implemented would be to attract more funds through further liberalization of
the exchange rate that would divert funds from the black market in foreign exchange to the
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official system. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this was the situation that Jamaica
faced in 1991, even after the 1990 liberalization. Thus, a liberalization of the currency to attract
foreign exchange, given the country’s letters to the IMF and to the World Bank, are
understandable.
The IMF and Jamaican Foreign Exchange Liberalization in Summary
In closing, it is evident that the IMF’s policies in Jamaica played a meaningful role in motivating
the liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime and thus in the implementation of the
high interest rate policy which in turn drove Jamaica’s financial crisis of the 1990s. Devaluation
of the Jamaican dollar spurred inflation that resulted in the overvaluation of the Jamaican dollar
and caused the black market in foreign exchange to flourish. To attract foreign exchange from
the black market to the official foreign exchange market, the government had to gradually
liberalize the foreign exchange regime to make prices for the Jamaican dollar in the official
market competitive with prices in the black market. Secondly, this mechanism had to be utilized
because the country’s financial position essentially rendered it dependent on the IMF. However,
the IMF’s policies did not stimulate growth but used ineffective methods such as devaluation in
an aim to increase the island’s foreign exchange earnings and reserves. Given their inefficacy
and no additional production to spur economic growth to earn foreign exchange, the government
had to implement currency-related policies to manipulate the foreign currency flows. Thirdly,
these ineffective policies also destabilized the economy thus reducing confidence in the Jamaican
dollar. To attract foreign currency held outside of Jamaica and outside of the official foreign
exchange system, the government had to gradually liberalize controls on capital flows as well as
the pricing of Jamaica’s currency. Finally, through its emphasis on liberalization, the IMF in
collaboration with the World Bank made an at least partially liberalized currency a conditionality
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on which Jamaica borrowed necessary funds. Further, the conditionality limited the
government’s ability to reverse partial liberalization in the case that it went poorly. As such,
when the island continued to suffer from a shortage of foreign exchange under a partially
liberalized foreign exchange regime, its only meaningful source to accessing additional funds
was through diversion of further funds from the black market to the official system.
The IMF’s policies have been shown to have had a significant role in driving the liberalization of
Jamaica’s currency in 1991, and this liberalization resulted in the implementation of a high
interest rate regime which in turn was a substantial driver of the crisis of the 1990s. Therefore,
considering a longer-term horizon both regarding Jamaica’s economic trajectory, particularly its
relationship with the IMF, it is evident that the IMF’s policies played a major role in causing
Jamaica’s financial crisis of the 1990s.
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Chapter 3: The High Interest Rate Policy and the Collapse of the 1990s
Liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime occurred in September of 1991. In every
month after that, the inflation rate was not only higher than that of every one of the previous
months in 1991, but also higher than the inflation rate in the same period in 1990. For instance,
“inflation exploded to in excess of 55% by September 1991”.134 By the end of the year, the
inflation rate between December 1990 and December 1991 was an astounding 80%.
Based on chapter two’s description of Jamaica’s severe import dependency, this was no surprise.
Because liberalization of the foreign exchange regime was a de facto devaluation of the Jamaican
dollar and Jamaica was extremely dependent on imported goods, liberalization caused a
significant increase in the prices of most of the products in the economy. In fact, given the
government’s note that it would pursue “very tight demand-management policies with the aim of
stabilizing the exchange rate”, it is likely that it expected this reaction to currency liberalization.
Even before full-scale liberalization in 1991, Prime Minister Patterson, in his 1990 speech
announcing partial liberalization, noted that the government was aware that the “initial
implementation of these measures will cause hardships to some, especially the poor and
disadvantaged in our society”.135 Patterson’s subsequent references to expected increases in the
prices of certain goods and services suggests and to the provision of government programs to aid
people in their hardships suggest that the hardships that he was referring to had to do with the
inflation that would arise because of the partial liberalization of Jamaica’s currency controls.
In addition to, and partly because of, inflation, another problem being faced by Jamaica was
capital flight. In December 1991, former Governor of the Bank of Jamaica, Dr. Headley Brown,
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wrote “Capital flight has become the dominant factor in the instability currently being
experienced by the economy”. Brown explains this as being due to “the inflation
rate…approaching over 70%, while the maximum interest rate on savings deposits” was “just
over 20%”. This meant that individuals were earning a negative real rate of interest within the
range of 50%. Given this, Jamaicans were incentivized to convert their Jamaican dollars to US
dollars and to purchase interest-yielding foreign assets that provided them with a positive real
interest rate, in place of Jamaican interest-yielding assets which provided them with a negative
real interest rate.
However, as noted throughout this piece, Jamaica faced a chronic shortage of foreign exchange.
This meant that if individuals had begun to convert their Jamaican dollars to US dollars, a twofold problem would arise. Firstly, the shortage of foreign currency would be exacerbated and
would further impair the island’s ability to pay for imports and to service foreign debt. Secondly,
because of the demand for already scarce foreign currency and the flood of Jamaican dollars
being supplied to the market, the value of the Jamaican dollar would continue to fall relative to
the US dollar – further increasing inflation given Jamaica’s dependence on imports, and
impairing the government’s ability to service foreign debt given that the Jamaican dollars that it
would earn from tax revenues as well as from its businesses would be able to pay a smaller and
smaller fraction of the interest payments that it had to make.
This chapter will detail the implementation of the high interest rate policy in Jamaica – the aims
of the government in implementing the policy and how they went about aiming to achieve these
aims. Secondly, the chapter will show how the high interest rate policy led to the demise of many
financial institutions. It will use a few prominent examples from the banking and life insurance
sectors to illustrate this. Chapters one and two have established the long-term economic
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circumstances that led to Jamaica becoming involved with the IMF, and the way in which the
IMF’s policies drove the liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime and the attendant
high interest rate policy. Therefore, because this chapter illustrates the role of the high interest
rate policy in causing the crisis, its discussion will complete the picture of how the IMF’s
policies in Jamaica caused the crisis.
High Interest Rate Policy
Given this environment, the policy that was most dominant in the government’s, and the central
bank’s, efforts to stabilize the economy was a high interest rate policy. This was implemented by
open market policy as described in Chapter two, whereby the government sold bonds to the
public that offered extremely high rates of interest. The specific instruments utilized by the Bank
of Jamaica to institute this high interest rate policy were Certificates of Deposit (CDs). A
certificate of deposit is an interest-bearing “savings account” or financial instrument, “that holds
a fixed amount of money for a fixed period of time, such as six months.”136 As explained by Joan
Duncan, a co-founder of one of the largest financial institutions in Jamaica, “Bank of Jamaica
Certificates of Deposit are used…to dry up liquidity in the system. Liquidity simply means
money available to economic entities.”137 When an individual buys a CD, the issuing institution
pays interest on this instrument or account. When the agreed upon period comes to an end, the
holder of the CD receives his or her original deposit in addition to the interest earned on that
deposit.
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CDs were introduced by the Bank of Jamaica “in November 1985 as part of an action
programme agreed with the World Bank and having the blessing of the I.M.F. for reforming the
financial sector and improving the financial intermediation process in Jamaica.”138 Effectively, as
a part of the IMF’s and World Bank’s liberalization agenda in Jamaica – described in the
preceding chapter, they sought to implement policies whereby the central bank could use more
indirect policy to effect monetary policy such as open market operations rather than more direct
policy such as credit ceilings and set interest rates for banks and other financial institutions.
Selling CDs, an example of open market operations, allowed the central bank to influence
interest rates and money supply without influencing directly setting restrictions by which
financial institutions would operate.
The mechanism by which CDs were sold by the Bank of Jamaica was by auction. Periodically,
the Bank of Jamaica, would hold auctions for certificates of deposits on Fridays. At these
auctions, tenders of different interest rates would be made for these instruments. This meant that
individuals would bid based on the interest rates that they were willing to receive on these
instruments. The Bank would then decide whether it was willing to pay the interest rate tendered
by the potential purchaser of the CD. One of the ways in which the central bank attracted tender
offers was via newspaper ads. For example, on Monday November 16, 1992, the central bank
placed an advertisement in the Daily Gleaner inviting “tenders for approximately
$1,700,000,000.00 of Certificates of Deposit…to be dated November 19, 1992, and maturing in
May 18, 1993 (180 days).” The ad also noted that individuals would submit their tenders through
“tender forms…available from commercial banks, Brokers and Bank of Jamaica”. These forms
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would be received by the Bank on Thursday, November 19, 1992. Bids were for a minimum of
$5,000 and had to be made in “multiples of $1,000.00”. Therefore, in addition to newspaper ads,
the central bank evidently also used the commercial banks as a means by which to attract
purchasers of CDs. The Bank of Jamaica also reserved “the right to reject any tender.” 139 Of
course, the higher the interest rate, the more attractive it would be to the purchaser of the CD and
the lower the interest rate the more attractive to the seller of the CD. This is because the buyer
would receive the interest rate and the seller would pay it. As such, as the intent of the Bank of
Jamaica to pull cash out of the economy increased, the interest rate that it would offer on CDs
increased.
Shortly after liberalization in 1991, CD rates began to rise dramatically. For example, during the
auction on Friday, October 4, 1991, “the Bank of Jamaica rejected all bids above 38 per cent –
which represented 57% of the bids – saying that it was not prepared to absorb such a high cost
for its monetary policy.” However, by the auction held on Friday, December 6, 1991, the Bank
of Jamaica sold CDs at a record high 45 per cent rate of interest to several bidders. At that
auction, “Tenders ranged from 35 per cent to 45 per cent” and had a “weighted average of about
39.96%.” This was in line with the Bank’s commitment to “mopping up…$900 million…from
the hands of consumers as part of the government’s announced strategy to protect the exchange
rate of the Jamaican dollar.”140
As inflation rates continued to be troublesome, with prices rising 40% between December 1991
and December 1992, the rates of interest offered by the Bank of Jamaica’s CDs also continued to
increase substantially. In January of 1992, “interest rates on” CDs were “at 50 per cent.”141 For
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example, the auction on Friday, January 24, 1992, saw CDs remaining at 50 per cent for the third
consecutive auction.”142 A telling statistic as to the severe threat of capital flight and the lack of
confidence in the Jamaican economy at the time was that even with these financial instruments
offering yields of 50%, several of these auctions were still undersubscribed. For instance, “the
issue dated January 20” was “undersubscribed by 50 per cent”. This means that the central bank
was only able to sell half the amount, in dollars, of CDs that it intended to during that issue.
This high interest rate policy though implemented to address real problems being faced by the
Jamaican economy at the time – high inflation and an unstable currency, had some serious
negative consequences. As noted by scholar Roger Gordon, “one particularly dramatic
phenomenon associated with…high interest rates is an extraordinarily high bankruptcy rate.”143
Similarly, this chapter will argue that this policy and its effects played a substantial role in the
Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s because banks ultimately lent money at rates that were too
high for their depositors to pay. This then rendered these assets nearly worthless while the
liabilities that financed them were unchanged. Consequently, these banks failed and had to be
taken over by the government. Therefore, many of these loans continued to accrue interest on
the books of several of these banks but no actual cash was being collected. Given the lack of
deposit insurance in Jamaica at the time, as the plight of these banks became more obvious,
depositors began to withdraw their money in droves. Due to the poor assets – non-performing
loans – that backed these deposits, the banks eventually failed and had to be taken over by the
government.
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High Lending Rates
The primary reason for which the high interest rate policy implemented by the Bank of Jamaica
in the early 1990s played a meaningful role in the financial crisis of the 1990s was that it
increased the interest rates at which banks lent to borrowers to levels that were prohibitively
high. This occurred because the CDs being offered by the central bank offered higher rates of
interest than those which were available from commercial banks. Because of this, individuals
would have been more attracted to investing their cash into CDs offered by the Bank of Jamaica
than to invest in a deposit account at a commercial bank or another financial institution that
offered a lower rate of return. Therefore, to prevent the loss of customers and consequently,
deposits, commercial banks had to raise the rates of interest offered on their deposits.
However, banks make their profits by borrowing money from depositors at a given interest rate
and then lending it to borrowers at a higher interest rate. The bank’s profit would be the spread
between the interest it earns on money that it has lent less the interest that it pays on money that
it has borrowed. Given this, if banks raised the rates that they offered to depositors – to stop them
from taking out their deposits and placing them in government CDs but did not increase the rates
of interest that they charged depositors, they would eventually become unprofitable and go out of
business. Therefore, as the government raised interest rates to reduce liquidity in the economy
and commercial banks raised the rates at which they lent money, the rates at which businesses
were borrowing money were necessarily higher. For example, in early 1994, a survey conducted
by the Financial Gleaner revealed that banks such as Century National Bank were lending at
69% per annum, Victoria Bank Limited was lending at 68.5% per annum, Jamaica Citizens Bank
Limited was lending at 68% per annum, and Worker’s Bank at 65% per annum. Furthermore,
“Despite the tight monetary policy, commercial bank loans increased 73.86 per cent in October
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1993 over the same period of 1992.” Most of the increase were loans given out for consumption
which were up “some 117 per cent” loans provided to the “productive sectors – agriculture,
manufacturing, construction and mining” also increased by 19%, 56%, 36%, and 59%
respectively144. This firstly illustrates that interest rates were usuriously high but also that money
was being lent at these rates. Therefore, it is possible to understand the basis on which these
banks ultimately failed when debtors were unable to repay loans with interest rates in excess of
60%.
High Interest Rates and the Commercial Bank Crisis
The first bank to be implicated in the financial crisis of the 1990s was the Blaise Trust and
Merchant Bank. Newspaper articles and government documents released around the time during
which the bank began to experience difficulties do not provide meaningful information about the
failure of the bank. In fact, although the public did have some idea that the Bank of Jamaica was
monitoring and examining the bank’s solvency during 1994, there were some concerns about the
confidentiality surrounding the interaction between Blaise and the central bank. It is also
important to note that this interaction was due to the Bank of Jamaica investigating Blaise’s
health. Finance Minister Davies and his team were essentially ensuring that the bank’s health and
operational practices did not violate the regulatory requirements of the financial sector. However,
the public suspicion surrounding the inspection arose due to “rumors in the financial circles” that
suggested “a possible infringement of the Banking Act by Blaise Trust & Merchant Bank”. “The
Banking Act” set “the parameters within which banks” were to operate. It mandated “minimum
capital requirements…maximum deposit liabilities…cash reserves, liquid assets, returns”, and so
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forth. The public was concerned that in its interaction with Blaise, the central bank had
discovered violations of some of these requirements but was not revealing this to the public.
However, when contacted, “Mr. John Francis, general manager of Blaise Trust & Merchant
Bank” stated “that he had no reason to be worried and that it was ‘business as usual’ ” and that
he had not been informed “by the Boj of the Minister of Finance of any irregularities discovered
by the Boj inspection” The Bank of Jamaica also revealed no signs of problems but just
confirmed that it was “meeting its legal obligation of on-site supervision of all commercial and
merchant banks.”145
Despite Blaise and the central bank denying the existence of any violations of the Banking Act in
mid-1994, “Finance Minister Dr. Omar Davies shut down the Blaise Trust and Merchant Bank in
December” of the same year, “as it was said to be operating in contravention of proper
procedures.”146 Although the government did not announce the outright failure of the bank, it was
obvious that there was a meaningful mismatch between the bank’s assets and its liabilities which
meaningfully threatened its ability to repay its depositors. Aside from the Minister Davies
making a direct reference to Blaise’s “the liabilities of” Blaise’s “building society as the
industrial and provident society” exceeding “their asset base” during a Budget debate in the
Jamaican parliament, there were concerns among members of the Jamaican public who had
deposited with Blaise that they had lost their funds. For instance, in June of 1995, there was an
article written in the Gleaner regarding a 101-year-old woman, Miss Florence Farquharson, titled
‘My Funeral Money Gone’. Farquharson was described as “one of the many investors who have
lost all their life savings with the Blaise closure.” Again, highlighting the prominence of the high
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interest rate policy in public discourse and in influencing the behavior of individuals interacting
with the financial sector, Farquharson was highlighted by the article’s writer as not having been
lured to “Blaise by its high interest rate”, “unlike many investors.”147 Later in 1995, another
bank, several other banks including some which were to be central to the crisis such as Eagle
Financial Network, Century National Bank, and others, joined forces to donate money to
Farquharson to aid her in recovering some of her lost funds.148
A month after Blaise’s closure, a group of executives from other small, local financial
institutions joined to form the “Owner’s Club”, hoping to rescue Blaise’s depositors. They
sought to make up for the Blaise’s liquidity shortfall while seeking interest on commercial bank
reserves held at the central bank in exchange for the assistance that they were offering to Blaise.
Notably, they sought to exclude large commercial banks from the bailout plan in order to prevent
these banks from ‘taking advantage of the Blaise debacle’ by giving “the impression that the
smaller banks are not as safe.”149 However, this plan failed and a government bailout which
provided depositors with 90% of their balances at the bank was approved by the Supreme
Court.150
In the midst of the Blaise-related drama, in which members of the opposition party, the Jamaica
Labor Party (JLP) even implicated members of the incumbent People’s National Party (PNP)
government for being “beneficiaries of loans made by the beleaguered Blaise Trust and
Merchant Bank”151, another of Jamaica’s prominent banks began to experience difficulties. This
institution was Century National Bank (CNB). Between August and September of 1995, word
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began to emerge regarding the ‘liquidity problems’ being faced by Century National Bank152. By
November of the same year, the bank began to collect “homes, cars and other assets” from
borrowers who had outstanding non-performing loans with the bank, in order to repay ‘more
than $3.5 billion” loaned to it by the Bank of Jamaica while it faced difficulties with liquidity
earlier in the year.153 As the year closed, it was revealed that CNB was beginning to face a run by
depositors, as the bank’s deposit base fell by more than 50% between June and September of
1995. Going into 1996, the bank’s liquidity problems intensified and continued to negotiate with
various parties to inject cash into the institution. However, “after more than a year of
negotiations and failed attempts to raise additional capital to solve the financial crisis at…(CNB),
the Ministry of Finance stepped in…and took control of its main operations.”154 Several other
smaller institutions also began to experience difficulties at this point, including Citizen’s Bank
and Worker’s Bank.
High interest rates caused banks in Jamaica’s financial sector to fail primarily because the rates
were too high to be paid by borrowers. These borrowers included individuals, businesses, and
more specifically, several life insurances companies who borrowed money from these banks. The
life insurance crisis is discussed in the next section. An estimation by a prominent banker,
supplemented by calculations of the Bank of Jamaica, revealed that excluding the Bank of Nova
Scotia, about 45% of loans held as assets by financial institutions in mid-1997 were nonperforming. However, whereas life insurance companies are large single debtors, the debtors of
commercial banks were primarily single small businesses and single individuals. As such, this
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means that data regarding single instances of businesses and individuals unable to pay their loans
due to the high interest rate on these loans is limited. Nonetheless, other pieces of information
that provide evidence in this direction are helpful.
One such piece of evidence was provided by Peter Moses, then President of the Jamaica Bankers
Association and country corporate officer for Citibank’s branch in Jamaica, during his address at
the American Chamber of Commerce breakfast meeting in February 1998. Moses notes that the
“high level” of non-performing loans was worrisome and that it had “a direct relationship with
the sustained high interest rates” that were “the norm in the sector.” Moses noted that while there
were some “loans that would have been non-performing under any interest rate
environment…there are a number of viable and potentially viable businesses” that comprised “a
large part of the…non-performing portfolio.”155 To relate this to one of the institutions previously
discussed, it was found that Century National Bank had billions of dollars in non-performing
loans which formed most of its portfolio of loans. Thus, this point being made by Moses relates
directly to the banks discussed earlier and to the crisis in Jamaica’s financial sector at the time.
It is also important to acknowledge the obvious potential for bias in Moses’ statement given his
position as a banker and president of an association of bankers. It is likely that this position made
him more likely to blame factors external to the lending decisions of banking executives both to
protect his image and that of his colleagues. However, firstly, Moses does acknowledge that
some loans were just fundamentally poor. Secondly, because a financial crisis is too complex to
be distilled into one particular cause, Moses’ statement, biased or not, can still be accepted as
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one of the relevant factors given the logic and factual evidence (high lending rates) that offer
support.
Though not presenting evidence of a bankruptcy or non-performing loan, further evidence of the
impact of the high interest rate policy on debtor businesses is evidenced in the complaints of
Chairman of the Hardware Merchants Association, Garth Scott, who in early 1998 also
complained about the high interest rate policy. Scott noted that the policy was responsible for
“dismantling the local construction industry, the mainstay of its members’ businesses.” More
importantly, Scott noted the high interest rate policy as having negatively “impacted…the
operating costs of individual hardware operators.” He further notes that given the threat to the
businesses’ survival posed by these interest rates, they would aim to increase the efficiency with
which they were managed so that they would borrow less so as “to reduce interest expenses.”
Finally, Scott notes plans to work with other “interest groups” in the construction industry to
“agitate for lower interest rates”. 156
One more useful example is provided in the financial difficulties faced by small hoteliers in
Negril, Westmoreland. Negril is a popular tourist destination located in the parish of
Westmoreland on Jamaica’s western coast. In February 1997, “a team from the National
Investment Bank of Jamaica…met with representatives of the Negril Resort Board…to discuss
ways in which the Government…could assist small hoteliers facing difficulties.” These
difficulties concerned infrastructural development occurring in the area that was diverting
business away from the hotels. However, more importantly, “the high cost of funds had left
many hotels on the verge of bankruptcy”. Given that, these hoteliers were seeking the
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Government’s assistance to “refinance existing loans”. Additionally, these hoteliers requested
that these loans, if made in US dollars be offered at interest rates between 5% and 7%, and “not
exceeding 15 per cent” if made available in Jamaican dollars.157 Of course, this represents again
the burden being faced by businesses borrowing from commercial banks during this period, and
the resultant threat of bankruptcy that it posed to them.
As such, given these examples, although specific businesses or individuals are not named by
FINSAC, and primary sources do not offer meaningful information as to specific cases of bad
debtors to commercial banks and the reasons for which they failed, it is evident that the high
interest rate policy meaningfully affected businesses abilities to service their debt during this
time in Jamaica. Therefore, among FINSAC’s commitments to purchase $15.2 billion in nonperforming loans from failed financial institutions and among the many businesses and homes
foreclosed by the institution, it is certain that the prohibitive interest rates as evident in lending
rates of 60% per annum played a significant role in the inability of these individuals to pay their
debts and thus in the ultimate insolvency of the banks that made these loans. 158
High Interest Rates and the Life Insurance Crisis
In addition to the difficulties being faced by commercial banks, another segment of Jamaica’s
financial sector facing difficulties at this time was the life insurance sector.
One of the major players at the centre of the life insurance crisis was Dr. Paul Chen-Young’s
conglomerate - the Eagle Financial Network. Chen-Young, an ex-World Bank employee and top
executive at the Jamaica Development Bank, was the founder and CEO of the Eagle Financial
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Network. The parent company of the financial institutions in the conglomerate was the Crown
Eagle Life Insurance Company. While Blaise and Century had been taken over by the Ministry
of Finance, given their liquidity difficulties, in 1995 and 1996 respectively, Eagle appeared to be
thriving throughout both years. In fact, just in December of 1996, one of Eagle’s subsidiaries was
advertising one of its financial products offered to the public as “The #1 Money Market Fund for
1996.”159
However, despite this image of strength, in early January 1997, Chen-Young pleaded to the
government to assist the life insurance sector. He stated that “it cannot be in the interest of the
country for those difficulties, facing the life insurance industry, not to be addressed with the
greatest of urgency.”160 These institutions had begun to face an insolvency crisis given the high
interest rate loans that they borrowed to finance long-term investments in assets that that did not
generate sufficient cash flows to service these debt payments.
Given pleas from Chen-Young and other executives in the life insurance industry, on January 9,
1997, Prime Minister P.J. Patterson and Minister of Finance Omar Davies created a company
known as the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC). Initially, approximately $1.7
billion in assistance to several life insurance companies was authorized. However, as greater
problems and needs arose, the amount pledged and the institutions to which it was pledged
broadened in scope.161 FINSAC’s purpose was to make debt and equity investments in failed
financial institutions in the financial sector with the ultimate aim of protecting the money of
depositors at failed banks and that of policyholders at failed insurance companies. These cash
infusions would finance the restoration of most or all of depositors’ and policyholders’ funds
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while FINSAC would assume non-performing loans or underperforming real estate and other
assets from these financial institutions. It would then collect collateral or repayment from the
debtors of non-performing loans and seek to liquidate underperforming assets such as office
buildings and hotels in order to recover as much cash as possible. There are many aspects of this
institution’s engagements with the public such as the loss of homes and businesses on the part of
bad debtors, suicide because of the financial difficulties that these debtors faced, and the great
cost incurred by taxpayers to finance this rescue of Jamaicans’ whose funds were invested in the
financial system. These subjects would make for rich discussion. However, such a discussion
would diverge too greatly from the focus of this chapter which is to illustrate the role of the high
interest rate policy in causing the Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s.
By February 25, 1997, the front page of the island’s most prominent newspaper was dominated
by the title “Chen-Young to step down”. This was part of “an agreement with the Government as
part of its much heralded $6.3 billion assistance program for the financial sector.”162 In addition
to Chen-Young relinquishing his position of Chairman of the group, several of the
conglomerate’s subsidiaries were to face restricting. It is also important to note that several other
top executives of insurance companies were being required to step down given the difficulties
being experienced by the entire sector at the time. In mid-March, however, “by mutual
agreement with FINSAC, the directors of Crown Eagle Life Insurance Company” agreed to “the
sale for $1.00 of their shareholdings in Crown Eagle Life Insurance Co. Ltd., the holding
company of all Eagle entities.” This acquisition by the government agency was because of the
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insurance company’s insolvency and marked the end of Eagle’s existence as a dominant force in
Jamaica’s financial sector.163
Similar to the situation with the commercial banks, the high interest rate policy played a
substantial role in the distress faced by the life insurance companies. Because of raging inflation
brought about by liberalization of the Jamaican dollar, and the high interest rate instruments
being offered by the Government of Jamaica, these life insurance companies had to sell high,
flexible interest rate short term policies to individuals. For example, there was a “savings-type
policy” that required the policyholder to make periodic payments on which the insurance
company paid interest. There were also lump sum policies where the policy holder paid a large
lump sum on which the company paid interest. As Chen-Young explained, “The public was no
longer interested in buying” life insurance policies “which in the past provided the long-term
saving to finance long-term investments” because these “policies gave a negative rate of return
during periods of high inflation”. Effectively, due to the threat of a “negative rate of return”
referred to by Chen-Young, individuals were wary of purchasing long-term policies that
provided a fixed payout. This was because if inflation continued to increase, the ‘real’ value of
this payout – its purchasing power – would be substantially reduced. Therefore, short-term
policies provided the benefits of insurance while simultaneously guarding against meaningful
erosion of purchasing power.
However, these insurance companies invested the funds that they received from the
policyholders into “long-term investments which yielded no income or income which was
substantially less than” the minimum required rate of interest to be earned on the loans.164 With
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their investments earning little to no income and lump-sum policies coming due, these insurance
companies were unable to repay policyholders and instead issued more lump-sum policies at
high interest rates and also took out loans at high interest rates from commercial banks. This
simply compounded their inability to make payments to policyholders as well as to banks which
loaned them money. Essentially, the assets which were purchased with the liabilities were worth
less than the liabilities, rendering them insolvent. They then sought aid from the government
which had to devise a bailout plan for the sector.
One particularly useful illustration of the effect of the high interest rate policy is on Mutual Life
Insurance Company, Jamaica’s largest life insurance company at the time of the crisis.165
FINSAC injected funds into the struggling institution in 1997 in exchange for an ownership
interest. This injection of cash served to save insurance policy holders who had invested their
money with the institution. Like the other life insurance companies that also experienced
difficulties, most of the investments backing Mutual Life’s liabilities were made in real estate.
As part of the bailout agreement with FINSAC, these investments would be liquidated in order to
provide cash to meet as many the company’s liabilities as was possible. Mutual Life held an
extensive real estate portfolio. It held stakes in several notable hotel properties such as
“Hedonism II…Boscobel Beach Hotel, Runaway Beach Hotel, Terra Nova Hotel & Restaurant
and the Courtleigh Hotel.” However, more importantly, these were just noted to be the stakes “at
the top of the list” meaning that the company held ownership stakes in several other properties.
In addition, it was noted as being “among the island’s most diverse property owners”, holding
stakes in several offices and land holdings. That this was not unique to Mutual Life is evident in
the fact the offering of these properties was noted as “adding to the glut of properties on the
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market from…Dyoll, Island Life and Life of Jamaica” – all other insurance companies.
However, the problem faced by life insurance companies was not just the ownership of these
assets but the fact that they were worth less than the company’s liabilities and did not generate
enough income for the company to service its debt. An example of the company’s horrid debt
load is evident in one description of the post-bailout restructuring of its debt. The National
Commercial Bank (NCB), its largest creditor, was provided with long-term debt instruments at
more reasonable interest rates to replace a “huge debt pile at penal interest rates” that it owed to
NCB.166
Again, as late as in 1999, when the company’s debts and operations were still being
restructured, the company was facing the loss of “four of its best properties” which “were
pledged as security” for a $590 million bond offering made by the company “in September
1995” at an obviously high interest rate of 33%.167 This exemplifies the dilemma faced by these
companies in raising high-cost short-term debt that was then invested into illiquid long-term
assets or at least backed by long-term assets that did not produce sufficient income to service the
debt.
Several other major life insurance companies involved in the crisis included Life of Jamaica,
Island Life, and Dyoll Life, to name a few. By the mid-March 1997, the government’s bailout
agency, FINSAC had acquired a 25% stake in all these companies168 with the hope of
maximizing the savings of depositors’ money which was threatened by commercial banks owed
funds by these insurance companies. They too had extensive property and other illiquid long-
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term investments which did not allow them to make the high interest payments that they owed on
the large amounts of short-term debt that they incurred.
Social Implications of the Crisis
The social implications of the crisis, because of FINSAC or other factors or actors, are not the
focus of this chapter or of the work at large. However, it is interesting to note in passing that the
social impact of this crisis was significant for the Jamaican people. Ironically, this hurt those that
borrowed money at high interest rates more than bank depositors who were initially at risk of
losing all their savings. Generally, financial crisis have more negative implications for bank
depositors whose money has been lent to failed businesses or to bankrupt individuals. However,
in the case of the Jamaican crisis, several ‘bad debtors’ who had borrowed from banks at high
interest rates and were unable to repay these funds, committed or contemplated suicide. Others
lost their spouses and families during the chaos, and many lost their homes and businesses.
To give a brief example, Mecheck Willis, a former businessman was one such victim of
FINSAC. Willis relayed his experience of moving from “living comfortably with his wife and
his five children in his four-bedroom, two-bathroom house” and working in “his thriving
business” which had several employees to living in a “one-room, wood-zinc-and-cloth shack in a
depressed community” relaying on churches for meals. According to Willis, he borrowed about
$330,000 from the bank to fund one of his businesses. After the bank failed and was taken over
by FINSAC, Willis was notified that he owed $11 million. Shortly after, he returned home one
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day to find his possessions on the street in front of what was his home, and he was notified that
FINSAC sold his home because of his debt.169
Therefore, although this thesis focuses on economics and finance, it is also important to
highlight, even briefly, the social impacts of these sectors and to acknowledge the human lives
behind the economic and financial analysis.
Closing
In closing, it is evident that the high interest rate policy implemented by Jamaica’s government
and monetary authorities in the early 1990s had terrible economic consequences which
manifested themselves in a crisis several years later in the mid to late 1990s. To combat inflation
driven by the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime in the early 1990s, the government
instituted tight-demand monetary policy, highlighted by a high interest rate regime which saw
interest rates on government securities in the range of 50% to combat inflation that rose as high
as 80% in 1992. However, because of the threat of losing depositors to higher interest rates being
offered by government securities, banks raised the interest rates that they paid on their deposits.
However, to maintain – and in some cases increase, their profits, they also raised the rates at
which they lent to prohibitively high levels – greater than 60% at several institutions in 1994.
Individuals and businesses that borrowed at these rates were eventually unable to repay their
debts leading to the collapse of the financial sector. Life insurance companies, also unable to
attract long-term policy holders, offered highly risky short-term policies at high interest rates.
When their long-term illiquid investments could neither service interest payments on these
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policies nor be liquidated at a sufficient value, the sector collapsed, forcing the government to
organize a bailout package to rescue billions of dollars invested by the Jamaican people.
Finally, despite the clear role of the high interest rate policy in causing the crisis, it is important
to note that this was simply one factor. Other important factors such as insufficient regulation
and poor managerial decisions played an important role in causing the crisis. For example, it
maybe would have been a more prudent decision for banks to lose some deposits and accept
lower profits while maintaining solvency than to risk – and eventually sacrifice – the solvency of
their institutions in order to retain customers. Additionally, many of the life insurance products
that were sold as life insurance were minimally insurance products and largely deposits being
accepted by insurance companies. In fact, it is estimated that less than 1% of the funds collected
under several of these policies was put towards insurance and necessarily, more than 99% was
effectively an investment vehicle. More stringent regulation of the insurance sector would have
prevented this. Thus, although the high interest rate was indubitably a central factor in the
collapse of the financial sector, it is important to acknowledge the important roles played by
others factors.
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Conclusion
In September of 1990, Acting Prime Minister P.J. Patterson announced the partial liberalization
of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime. Nearly a year later, on September 25, 1991, Minister of
Finance, Omar Davies announced the full liberalization of Jamaica’s foreign exchange regime.
Almost immediately, the policy inflicted intensified economic hardship on the lives of the
Jamaican people. It fueled ravaging inflation, proliferated the dearth of foreign exchange in the
island, and drove a precipitous decline in the value of the Jamaican dollar. To combat these
impacts of the liberalization, the government introduced a tight-demand economic policy, aimed
at “mopping up liquidity” in the words of Minister Davies, or said otherwise, taking cash out of
the pockets of the Jamaican people. Minister Davies hoped that this policy would limit spending,
thereby limiting inflation, and restoring economic stability to Jamaica. The central element of
this policy package was what is still known today as “the high interest rate policy”. Shortly after
its implementation in 1991, interest rates offered on Jamaican securities exceeded 50% by early
1992. However, as demanded by the natural interconnectedness of any economic forces, the
influence of this policy was not limited to the interest rates offered on government securities nor
even to its effects on the intended economic targets such as inflation and the value of the
Jamaican dollar. Instead, its influence infiltrated Jamaica’s banking sector, driving both deposit
and lending rates to prohibitive levels – for instance, lending rates exceeded 60% per annum in
1994. Ultimately, these high interest rates, compounded by the nation’s unenviable economic
performance at the time, rendered borrowers unable to service their debts – on time for some and
at all for others.
Beginning in 1994, banks began to succumb to the growing proportion of their loans which were
made to borrowers that could not repay them. First was the Blaise Trust and Merchant Bank.
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Next was Century National Bank. Shortly after, dozens of banks, whose loan assets were less
valuable than their deposit succumbed to insolvency.
Life insurance companies, not to be denied the funds of potential policyholders, were also drawn
into the fray, offering near impossible rates of return on policyholders’ investments which were
to come due in massive lump sums only short periods after. However, imprudent investments of
these high interest rate short term loans, into low-return long-term real estate investments
eventually drove these institutions into insolvency when their assets were appraised at lower
values than their liabilities.
In response to the crisis Jamaica’s government then organized a scheme to secure the funds of
Jamaican employees and pensioners whose deposits sat with these banks, and those of
policyholders with life insurance companies. Ultimately, this cost Jamaican taxpayers billions of
dollars, and arguably more importantly, ravaged the lives of many bankrupt debtors who lost
homes and businesses, and in some cases, their lives by suicide.
In analyzing the crisis, many scholars understandably dedicate a substantial portion of their
analysis to analyzing and illustrating the role that insufficient regulation of the financial sector
played in causing the crisis. Others criticize government economic policy implemented during
the immediate post-crisis period. Some speak to the poor decisions made by managers of
financial institutions. These are all reputable and important arguments.
Nonetheless, these works neglect a longer-term analysis of the trajectory of Jamaica’s economy
in causing the financial crisis of the 1990s. More specifically, these pieces fail to recognize the
role played by Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF and the World Bank between the late 1970s
and the early 1990s and how that long-term relationship played a substantial role in driving the
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island’s economy and financial sector to ruin. Accordingly, this thesis contributes to the
literature by highlighting Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF and to a lesser extent, the World
Bank, and how the austerity-based economic policies implemented in the island throughout the
late 1970s, the 1980s, and the early 1990s played a meaningful role in causing the crisis.
In summary, the piece argues that the IMF’s policies in Jamaica were inappropriate given the
structure of the Jamaican economy, did nothing to increase economic growth in Jamaica – the
only sustainable source of much needed foreign exchange, destabilized the Jamaican economy,
and championed economic philosophies that were ultimately unsuited to the Jamaican economy.
Another key impact of these policies was that they strengthened the growth of Jamaica’s black
market in foreign exchange, exacerbating the dearth of foreign exchange faced by the island. In
an attempt to obtain much needed foreign exchange, the Jamaican government could not help but
resort to manipulations of the foreign exchange regime to drive foreign exchange from the black
market into the official financial system. One such policy was the liberalization of the foreign
exchange regime – partially in 1990 and fully in 1991.
There are several potential areas of focus for future research. For example, while this thesis
focuses on the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, future research may focus on the
role of financial liberalization in causing the crisis. This research would be centered particularly
around the removal of direct monetary controls such as credit ceilings, mandated lending rates,
and interest rate floors in the early 1990s in Jamaica. What was the role of these policies in
causing the crisis? How did they interact with other noted causes to cause the crisis? Another
potential area of focus is the immediate effects of the crisis. How did the failure of so many
businesses, and the loss of so many homes and lives affect the morale of the Jamaican people?
How did it change the attitude of Jamaicans towards financial institutions and towards taking the
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risk of entrepreneurship? Answering questions such as this may shed some light into some of the
extra-economic impacts of the IMF policies.
Finally, it is important to address the significance of this research. This research is important for
several reasons. Firstly, understanding the underlying forces of a crisis such as this is inherently
important because a lack of understanding may doom Jamaica to experiencing it again. Although
understanding does not preclude its repetition, it at least provides Jamaica, its people, and its
policy markers with the requisite tools to lower the probability of its reoccurrence. Additionally,
the social and economic loss experienced by so many Jamaicans as a result of this crisis adds
significance to the research. Being able to provide a deeper understanding of what happened and
why it happened, to so many who had no control over the longer-term drivers of the crisis,
provides some form of closure and solace to those who were so badly affected. Additionally,
given that this work adds a unique and more recent perspective to the scholarship surrounding
the crisis aids in stimulating further study of, and engagement with, Jamaican economic history.
As the illustrious civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King once noted “We are made by
history.” We all have the desire to understand our own origins and that of those we admire. To
that end, this piece also plays a role in aiding Jamaicans and others intrigued by its history to
understand this monumental point in Jamaica’s history. It is the researcher’s hope that this
greater understanding leads them to better understand how they and their society today was
made, at least in part, by the Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s. Finally, though only briefly
mentioned, this work can begin to give a voice to Jamaicans such as Mecheck who have suffered
brutally because of the crisis. Despite the indisputable responsibility that they have for their
personal choices such as borrowing from the bank, one may still make the reasonable argument
that their lives have been shaped substantially by forces around and above them that they could
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not and did not control. Therefore, hopefully this work brings such issues to the attention of
those who are able and willing to make policy, and to commit to behaviors that minimize the
probability of the recurrence of a calamity such as this one.
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